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ABSTRACT
INITIATING EVENT ANALYSIS OF A LITHIUM FLUORIDE THORIUM REACTOR
Nicholas Charles Geraci
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Dr. C. Ariel Pinto
The primary purpose of this study is to perform an Initiating Event Analysis for a Lithium
Fluoride Thorium Reactor (LFTR) as the first step of a Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). The
major objective of the research is to compile a list of key initiating events capable of resulting in
failure of safety systems and release of radioactive material from the LFTR.
Due to the complex interactions between engineering design, component reliability and
human reliability, probabilistic safety assessments are most useful when the scope is limited to a
single reactor plant. Thus, this thesis will study the LFTR design proposed by Flibe Energy. An
October 2015 Electric Power Research Institute report on the Flibe Energy LFTR asked “what-if?”
questions of subject matter experts and compiled a list of key hazards with the most significant
consequences to the safety or integrity of the LFTR. The potential exists for unforeseen hazards to
pose additional risk for the LFTR, but the scope of this thesis is limited to evaluation of those key
hazards already identified by Flibe Energy.
These key hazards are the starting point for the Initiating Event Analysis performed in this
thesis. Engineering evaluation and technical study of the plant using a literature review and
comparison to reference technology revealed four hazards with high potential to cause reactor core
damage. To determine the initiating events resulting in realization of these four hazards, reference
was made to previous PSAs and existing NRC and EPRI initiating event lists. Finally, fault tree and
event tree analyses were conducted, completing the logical classification of initiating events.
Results are qualitative as opposed to quantitative due to the early stages of system design
descriptions and lack of operating experience or data for the LFTR.

In summary, this thesis analyzes initiating events using previous research and inductive and
deductive reasoning through traditional risk management techniques to arrive at a list of key
initiating events that can be used to address vulnerabilities during the design phases of LFTR
development.
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NOMENCLATURE

ARE – Aircraft Reactor Experiment
BWR – Boiling Water Reactor
EPRI – Electric Power Research Institute
GFR – Gas-cooled Fast Reactor
GIF – Generation IV Forum
I&C – Instrumentation and Control Circuitry
IE – Initiating Event
LFR – Lead-cooled Fast Reactor
LFTR – Lithium Fluoride Thorium Reactor (A specific application of MSR)
LWR – Light Water Reactor (Generic name encompassing both PWR and BWR)
MSBR – Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
MSR – Molten Salt Reactor
MSRE – Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (Oak Ridge National Laboratory)
NRC – Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ORNL – Oak Ridge National Laboratory
PSA – Probabilistic Safety Assessment
PWR – Pressurized Water Reactor
QRA – Quantitative Risk Analysis
SCWR – Supercritical Water-cooled Reactor
URW – Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal
VHTR – Very High Temperature Gas Reactor
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Enrico Fermi and his fellow engineers brought the Chicago Pile (CP-1) to
criticality in December 1942, nuclear fission and its application in electrical power generation has
been a source of intrigue, inspiration and controversy. The world’s first nuclear reactor, CP-1
consisted of a rudimentary stack of uranium metal and uranium oxide fuel bricks interspersed
between graphite blocks designed to absorb neutrons. The experiment was assembled beneath the
west stands of Stagg Field at the University of Chicago as part of the Manhattan Project (Koppes
n.d.). Called “a crude pile of black bricks and wooden timber” by Fermi (Kelly 2007, 83), the reactor
was controlled by withdrawing neutron absorbent rods, allowing the neutrons to cause fission in
the uranium fuel, which resulted in the world’s first sustained nuclear reaction.
In the decades that followed, nuclear fission reactions would be used in many diverse ways
including heat production for power generation; weapons applications; and medical, chemical and
metallurgical studies. The first generation of prototype nuclear reactors gave birth to more stable
and safer commercial power reactors. For nearly 60 years, nuclear power was dominated by the
use of light-water cooled reactors (LWR). Specifically, pressurized water reactors (PWR) and
boiling water reactors (BWR) using light water (H2O) as both the coolant and neutron moderator
were the industry standard. This momentum behind PWR and BWR technology led to streamlined
licensure and operation at the expense of exploring alternative technologies for nuclear fission.
By the early-2000s, after several iterations of technological advances to PWR and BWR
technology, scientists and engineers from around the world convened a forum to discuss the future
of nuclear fission and its role in power generation. In response to growing energy demand and in
light of continued research demonstrating the harmful effects of fossil fuel use, the turn of the 21st
century saw a renewed interest in the development of advanced nuclear reactor technologies as
viable and competitive sources of electrical power. Chartered in mid-2001, the Generation IV
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International Forum (GIF) represents a collective of 13 countries in which nuclear power plants are
seen as vital for meeting future energy demands (World Nuclear Association 2016). After
significant deliberation and review of countless proposed reactor designs, the GIF announced the
selection of six very promising designs. Selection criteria demanded that the proposed reactor
designs be “clean, safe and cost-effective means of meeting increased energy demands on a
sustainable basis, while being resistant to diversion of materials for weapons proliferation and
secure from terrorist attacks” (World Nuclear Association 2016).

Figure 1. The Evolution of Nuclear Power Plants from Generation I to Generation IV
(World Nuclear Association 2016)

Ultimately, the goal of the GIF is to direct international efforts in research and development
of these advanced nuclear reactors in order to replace the aging PWR and BWR infrastructure
beginning as early as 2020-2030. A brief description of each of the six advanced nuclear reactor
technologies selected by the GIF is provided below.


Gas-cooled Fast Reactors (GFR): The GFR is a helium-cooled reactor reliant on fastspectrum neutrons for fission of solid uranium fuel. The fuel will be assembled in
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hexagonal elements consisting of ceramic-clad, mixed-carbide-fueled pins within a
ceramic hexagonal tube. Helium gas will be circulated through the core of solid fuel
where it is heated to 850°C. At the reactor outlet, the primary helium coolant rejects
heat to a secondary helium-nitrogen mixture, which in turn drives a closed cycle gas
turbine. The waste heat from the gas turbine heats a steam generator, which drives a
steam turbine, resulting in a combined power cycle common in natural gas-fired power
plants (The Generation IV International Forum 2017).


Lead-cooled Fast Reactors (LFR): The LFR is a molten lead or lead-bismuth eutecticcooled reactor reliant on fast-spectrum neutrons for fission of solid uranium or solid
actinides from spent LWR fuels. The molten lead or lead-bismuth eutectic (44.5% lead,
55.5% bismuth) primary coolant rejects heat to a closed cycle carbon dioxide gas
turbine through heat exchangers. Waste heat from the turbine drives a steam generator
and steam turbine in a combined cycle similar to that described for the GFR. Because of
its high boiling point, the primary coolant in the LFR need not be pressurized. This lowpressure reactor obviates the need for high-strength pressure vessels required in legacy
LWRs and some other proposed advanced reactors (The Generation IV International
Forum 2017).



Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFR): The SFR is a liquid sodium-cooled reactor reliant on
fast-spectrum neutrons for fission of solid uranium-plutonium fuel, oxide or metal fuel,
or uranium-plutonium-actinide-zirconium fuel (dependent on the reactor size). Liquid
sodium is circulated through the core where temperatures are raised to ~550°C. In the
primary heat exchangers, the lead coolant rejects heat to an intermediate sodium loop
before the secondary sodium heats a closed gas cycle to drive a turbine power
conversion system. Similar to the LFR, the SFR primary coolant remains liquid at low
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pressures; therefore, this design does not require any pressure vessels required in
legacy LWRs (The Generation IV International Forum 2017).


Supercritical Water-cooled Reactors (SCWR): The SCWR is a high-temperature, highpressure light water-cooled reactor that operates above the thermodynamic critical
point of water (374°C, 22.1 MPa). Similar to a BWR, the SCWR is a once-through steam
cycle in which subcooled liquid water is raised to temperatures and pressures that
constitute superheated steam within the core. The superheated steam is used directly to
drive a steam turbine power conversion system. Exhausted steam is condensed and
returned to the core using a feed pump to recommence the cycle. The SCWR offers
significantly improved thermal efficiencies over legacy LWRs due to the high
temperatures (500-625°C) but suffers from safety concerns with the associated high
pressures (>20 MPa). Still, coal-fired industry has significant operating experience using
superheated steam in power generation and many technologies may be adapted for use
in the SCWR (The Generation IV International Forum 2017).



Very High-temperature Gas Reactors (VHTR): The VHTR is a helium-cooled, graphite
moderated reactor reliant and thermal-spectrum neutrons to fission various fuel
sources. Two types of core are being explored: the prismatic fuel block and pebble bed
core, both of which can use open cycle uranium fuel, or closed cycle uranium-plutonium,
thorium-uranium or mixed-oxide fuel (MOX). The VHTR is unique among Generation IV
designs as it is primarily dedicated to cogeneration of electrical power and hydrogen
gas. The hydrogen gas is extracted via thermo-chemical or electro-chemical processes
driven by the extremely high temperatures of the helium gas (~1000°C). Of course, the
high temperature of the outlet gas yields a high primary system pressure and
necessitates pressure vessels to contain the reactor core and primary loops. The power
conversion system can be either closed cycle gas turbine or steam turbine depending on
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the final outlet temperature of the primary helium (The Generation IV International
Forum 2017).


Molten Salt Reactors (MSR): The MSR is a lithium-fluoride or lithium-beryllium-fluoride
salt cooled reactor reliant on fast- or thermal-spectrum neutrons to fission liquid
uranium fuel suspended in the coolant. In thermal-spectrum designs, the graphite
moderator is positioned in the core to thermalize neutrons to facilitate fission. In all
designs, MSRs stand out as unique in their use of liquid fuel suspended in the primary
coolant, instead of solid fissile fuel positioned in the reactor core. Heat generated in the
molten salt coolant is exchanged to an intermediate salt loop, which then drives a
supercritical CO2 closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system. Because the proposed
salts (lithium-fluoride or lithium-beryllium-fluoride) have high boiling points (1676°C)
at atmospheric pressures, the MSR is designed to operate at low pressures similar to
LFRs and SFRs (The Generation IV International Forum 2017). Additionally, because the
fissile fuel material is homogenously distributed in the primary coolant and not
concentrated in a solid matrix within the reactor core, the concept of “core meltdown”
due to loss of cooling is obsolete. Once circulation through the reactor core stops, fission
will not persist because the fuel is suspended within the coolant and not concentrated in
the core. This unique design feature is at the heart of the inherent safety of MSRs.
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REACTOR
Gas-cooled Fast
Reactor

COOLANT
Helium

FUEL
Solid hexagonal
uranium elements

TEMPERATURE
850°C

Lead-cooled Fast
Reactor

Lead or LeadBismuth
Eutectic
Sodium

Solid uranium or
actinides

480-570°C

Sodium-cooled
Solid U-Pu, MOX or 500-550°C
Fast Reactor
U-Pu-Actinide
Supercritical
Light Water
Solid uranium or
510-625°C
Water Reactor
(H2O)
plutonium
Very High
Helium
Solid U-Pu, Th-U or 900-1000°C
Temperature Gas
actinides
Reactor
Molten Salt
Lithium
Liquid U-233 from 700-800°C
Reactor
Fluoride Salts
Th-U fuel cycle
Table 1. Comparison of Generation IV Advanced Nuclear Reactors
(The Generation IV International Forum 2017)

PRESSURE
90 Bar
(9MPa)
(Stainsby
n.d.)
Atmospheric
(Alemberti, et
al. 2014, 11)
Atmospheric
>22.1MPa
7 MPa (Oh, et
al. 2016)
Atmospheric

Of the six technologies selected for future research and development, four have significant
operating experience in research applications. Of the four technologies with previous operating
experience, one boasts a unique and highly desirable safety feature over all others. The Molten Salt
Reactor stands apart as the only GIF proposal that abandons the traditional design of a “solid
nuclear fuel core” and instead relies on dissolved fissile material into a molten salt coolant. The
safety benefit of this design concept is the complete absence of risk of “nuclear meltdown” in the
traditional sense. That is, the most dangerous risk scenario for traditional nuclear reactors exists
when cooling of the solid reactor core fails or is compromised. In this case, the solid nuclear fuel
may overheat and begin to melt or deform, causing a geometry of fuel and other material whose
nuclear fission characteristics are uncontrollable. If this occurs, the heat generated in the reactor
core could result in failure of other structural materials and a release of radioactive fission products
to the environment and public exposure to radiation. The risk of solid fuel meltdown is the basis for
most public concern and was the mode of failure in Chernobyl’s Reactor Four in 1986 and
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Fukushima Daiichi in 2011. This basic description of a “nuclear meltdown” becomes obsolete in the
Molten Salt Reactor because the nuclear fuel is not concentrated into solid elements in a reactor
core but is evenly disbursed in the circulating coolant. The reactor core is simply a vessel whose
geometry and materials enable fission of the uranium fuel suspended in the coolant. Once the salt
leaves the core, the nuclear reaction stops and heat is rejected to intermediate salt loops and then
to CO2 which drives a gas turbine. In the event that the fuel salt overheats, a frozen plug of salt in
the bottom of the reactor will melt away, draining the fuel salt into a subcritical collection tank
where nuclear fission is impossible.
The unique quality of liquid nuclear fuel makes the LFTR both inherently safe and
revolutionary in its method of employing nuclear fission. For this simple reason, Molten Salt
Reactors and specifically the Lithium Fluoride Thorium Reactor were selected as the subject of this
study. Flibe Energy’s LFTR is not, however, the first example of proposed MSR technology in the
United States.
1.1 EARLY MOLTEN SALT REACTOR EXPERIENCE
The initial development and operation of molten salt reactors was performed by
researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory following World War II. The Molten Salt Reactor
Experiment (MSRE) and the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) represent the only two molten salt
reactors ever built and operated in the United States.
In 1946 the United States Air Force initiated a program to develop a nuclear-powered
airplane under contract with Fairchild Engineering and the Airplane Corporation. In the years that
followed, heightened tensions of the Cold War drove the US Atomic Energy Council to establish the
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion (ANP) program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Tennessee.
Two proposals were put forth, the first calling for air through the jet engine to directly cool fuel
elements from the reactor, while the second called for an indirect cycle in which molten salt was
heated in the reactor and then cooled by the flow of air to the jet engines.
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The indirect cycle using molten salt was researched by ORNL and resulted in the Aircraft
Reactor Experiment (ARE), which took approximately 12 years to develop and was operational for
only nine days. The reactor shown in Figure 2 operated at a modest 2.5 MW of thermal output at
temperatures of ~1580°F (Rosenthal 2009, 26). Although the operation demonstrated the
feasibility of nuclear powered aircraft, the program was halted in 1961 with the election of
President John F. Kennedy. Still, the lessons learned in molten salt reactors and the developments in
materials and shield design would be used in the laboratory’s next undertaking: the Molten Salt
Reactor Experiment (MSRE).

Figure 2. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Aircraft Reactor Experiment (Operated in 1954)
(Rosenthal 2009, 27).

The Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) was funded by the Atomic Energy Council
following successful demonstration of the technology in the ARE. Originally, two distinct designs
were proposed that took the form of a single-fluid and a two-fluid reactor. In both variants,
Uranium-235 (235U) and Uranium-233 (233U) were used as fuel dissolved in lithium-fluoride and
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beryllium-fluoride salts, and a solid graphite matrix was constructed in the reactor core to act as a
neutron moderator.
In the single-fluid variant, 235U served as fuel mixed into a single coolant salt. 232Th was also
added to the coolant salt because of its large cross-section for neutron absorption and its ability to
decay into 233U, which is another fissile nuclear fuel. The ability of 232Th to absorb neutrons and
decay into fissile Uranium makes Thorium a “fertile” material. The single-fluid variant contained
fluoride salts, 233U and 232Th all in the same volume of fluid, which circulated through the reactor
core.
In the two-fluid variant, 235U is dissolved into fluoride salts and circulates through the core.
This is known as the “fuel salt” and contains the fissile Uranium needed for fission. A second fluid,
known as the “blanket salt” surrounds the reactor core and is separated from the fuel salt by a
mechanical barrier, usually made of graphite (Rosenthal 2009, 29). The blanket salt contains fertile
232Th

that absorbs neutrons that have escaped the core and then decays into 233U. A separate

chemical processing plant extracts the fissile 233U from the blanket salt and injects it into the fuel
salt, where it will enter the core and fission to create heat. Further detail on the 233U/232Th fuel cycle
is provided in Chapter 2, which describes the Flibe Energy LFTR in detail as a two-fluid molten salt
reactor.
The MSRE was a single-fluid molten salt reactor containing lithium-, beryllium-, and
zirconium-fluoride salts with dissolved 235U and 232Th. As the fuel salt passed through the graphitemoderated reactor core, neutrons from decaying fission products were slowed, or “moderated” to
energy levels that allowed absorption by the nuclear fuel and resulted in fissions. The kinetic
energy of the fission products created heat within the fuel salt. The heat was then transferred to an
intermediate fluoride salt and ultimately rejected to an air radiator that was cooled by blower fans.
Sump-type salt pumps were designed as the high point of the reactor, with access that allowed
sampling of the fluoride fuel salts and also allowed adding of more nuclear fuel. Both 233U and
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Plutonium were used later to demonstrate the flexibility of the MSRE to utilize different fissile
materials for fuel (Rosenthal 2009, 32).
The MSRE first went critical on June 1, 1965 using 235U, and was later brought critical on
October 2, 1968 using 233U. The MSRE operated until December 1969 but was shut down due to
budget constraints. The Atomic Energy Council had decided to redirect funds to the sodium-cooled
fast-spectrum breeder reactor and in 1973 the molten salt reactor program was dismantled
(Rosenthal 2009, 33). Nonetheless, significant achievements were realized during the MSRE,
demonstrating not only the feasibility but also the inherent safety of this novel technology. Much
advancement would be required to elevate the MSRE to an industrial scale, and government
funding proved inadequate to support such advancements. Thus it was almost 50 years before
universities, private investors and engineers began pursuing the revival of research on molten salt
reactors. Flibe Energy’s LFTR stands among only a handful of MSRs under development in the
United States today and is a direct representation of the Generation IV International Forum’s vision
for the future of advanced nuclear reactors.
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Figure 3. Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s Molten Salt Reactor Experiment
(Operated from 1965-1969) (Rosenthal 2009, p. 33)

1.2 PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ASSESSMENTS
In the 1970s, following two decades of successful operation of Generation I nuclear
reactors, engineers and licensing authorities became increasingly interested in developing a
method to capture the true magnitude of risk associated with operation of commercial nuclear
power plants. Two key founders of the quantitative risk assessment were B. John Garrick and Stan
Kaplan, engineers who worked together at the Atomic Energy Council and later formalized their
quantitative approach in an article titled “On the Quantitative Definition of Risk” (1981).
In their work, Kaplan and Garrick define the “triplet definition of risk” where the engineer
must answer the following three questions:
1. What can happen?
2. How likely is it that such an event will happen?
3. If it happens, what are the consequences?
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Answering these questions will result in a set of scenarios and their associated outcomes.
Consider Table 2 where a list of scenarios, the likelihood or probability of occurrence and the
consequence for each is captured.

Scenario
Likelihood
Consequences
s1
p1
x1
s2
p2
x2
…
…
…
sn
pn
xn
Table 2. Scenario List for Triplet Definition of Risk

The ith line of Table 2 can be thought of as a triplet:
<si , pi , xi>
where

si is a scenario identification or description
pi is the probability or likelihood of that scenario (deterministic or assumed); and
xi is the consequence or evaluation measure (i.e. measure of damage) (Kaplan and
Garrick 1981, 13)
Garrick and Kaplan's early work and continued research led to great breakthroughs in the

field of Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). In particular, the application of this approach to the
nuclear power industry became known as Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) and is used
extensively to this day as a tool for design risk mitigation and licensure of commercial nuclear
power plants.
In 1975, the first use of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment was demonstrated when the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission published the Reactor Safety Study under the direction of N.C.
Rasmussen of M.I.T. (Garrick 2008, 248). This work took over three years to complete and included
failure data from three decades of nuclear plant operations. Using these statistics, engineers were
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able to assign likelihoods of failure to different plant components, and quantify the consequences of
these failures.
In his work Quantifying and Controlling Catastrophic Risk, Garrick went on to refine his
approach to PSAs and listed the following six steps (Garrick 2008, 249) as a thorough methodology
for capturing the “triplet” mentioned above:
1. Define the system being analyzed in terms of what constitutes normal operation to serve as
a baseline reference point.
2. Identify and characterize the sources of danger, that is, the hazards (i.e. stored energy, toxic
substances, hazardous materials etc.).
3. Develop “what can go wrong” scenarios to establish levels of damage and consequences
while identifying points of vulnerability.
4. Quantify the likelihoods of the different scenarios and their attendant levels of damage
based on the totality of relevant evidence available.
5. Assemble the scenarios according to damage levels and cast the results into the appropriate
risk curves and risk priorities.
6. Interpret the results to guide the risk management process.
Unfortunately, for advanced nuclear reactors in the design stage it is often difficult or
impossible to quantify levels of damage as required in Step 3 or assign likelihoods of occurrence
required by Step 4. In an international effort to guide PSA efforts for advanced nuclear reactors, one
committee recognized that “the technical challenges of the PSA for new reactors, which are in the
last phases of design and commissioning stage, include a lack of design detail, a lack of empirical
data, and the possibility of failure scenarios that differ in character from those treated in PSAs for
current reactors” (Nuclear Energy Agency 2013, 5). Another engineer notes that “epistemic
problems such as uncertainties due to lack of design information, unknown phenomena, plant-
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specific hazards, data etc., are larger than that from existing reactors, and will impose a significant
challenge to decision makers” (Alrammah 2014).
In his work, Garrick agrees that quantitative risk assessments must be performed
individually for different proposed reactor plants due to the inherent changes in risk probabilities
based on design differences (Garrick 2008, 252). In observance of these limitations, analysis will be
conducted on the proposed Flibe Energy LFTR based on the availability of design descriptions and
existence of “what-if” analysis results for the Flibe Energy design.
Steps 1 and 2 of Garrick’s methodology were thoroughly addressed in the “Technology
Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015). The end result is a comprehensive list of
important hazards that pose the most significant consequences for safety or integrity of the LFTR
system. Step 3 of Garrick’s methodology then requires the engineer to determine “what can go
wrong.” In this step, an initiating event analysis must be conducted to determine how the identified
hazards may be realized. This initiating event analysis represents the first step to a Level 1
Probabilistic Safety Assessment. Figure 4 below illustrates the development of probabilistic safety
assessments, from Level 1 to Level 3.
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Figure 4. Development of Probabilistic Safety Assessments

This thesis falls short of satisfying the requirements of a Level 1 PSA because of the inability
to apply probabilities and core damage frequencies due to a lack of design detail and operating
experience. Still, the fault tree analysis and event tree analysis will prove useful to decision-makers
and engineers in identifying vulnerabilities to the current LFTR design.
Starting with the list of hazards identified by Flibe Energy and the EPRI, the objective of this
thesis is to conduct an Initiating Event Analysis. Using International Atomic Energy Agency
guidance, this process will involve a review of previous NRC and EPRI initiating events, reference to
previous PSAs, performance of event tree analysis (inductive reasoning) and performance of fault
tree analysis (deductive reasoning) using master logic diagrams. The goal is to develop a list of
initiating events that may lead to a violation of the safety or integrity of the Flibe Energy LFTR as
described in the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015). The author
recognizes that many unforeseen or undeveloped risks may exist in addition to those identified by
the EPRI and Flibe Energy. Later efforts to perform probabilistic safety assessments may
incorporate more specific design information, and may determine additional hazards not
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discovered by elicitation of expert judgment by the EPRI. However, for the purpose of scoping this
thesis, evaluation is limited to the list of primary hazards in Table 4-4 of the “Technology
Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor” (2015).
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
To provide a foundation of technological understanding, a description of the design and
operation of the two-fluid Flibe Energy LFTRs follows, including a breakdown of major system
components and engineered safety features. The majority of the system design description is
gathered from the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) with
supplemental information included from Oak Ridge National Laboratory MSRE and MSBR technical
documentation.
In the two-fluid LFTRs, lithium-beryllium-fluoride with uranium-tetrafluoride fuel (2LiF2BeF2-UF4) is the primary fuel salt that will be circulated through the reactor. The blanket salt is
comprised of lithium-beryllium-fluoride with thorium-tetrafluoride (2LiF2-BeF2-ThF4). The fuel salt
and blanket salt are kept physically separated by the reactor vessel, which is constructed to provide
separate plenums for each salt. As fission occurs in the reactor core, some neutrons released during
fission leak into the blanket salt and are absorbed by fertile 232Th. This neutron absorption begins
the thorium fuel cycle, shown below, in which fertile thorium is converted into fissile uranium.

232
1
90Th + 0n

→

Using a chemical processing plant,

233
90Th

233U

→β−

233
91Pa

→β−

233
92U

is then removed from the blanket salt and returned

to the fuel salt to maintain the inventory of fissile fuel. Within the reactor core, a solid graphite
moderator aids in slowing or “thermalizing” fission neutrons. Once in the thermal spectrum, the
neutrons can be absorbed by the 233U causing fission and heat generation. Heat is then transferred
to the fuel salt itself, which rejects heat to the intermediate loop and ultimately drives the
supercritical CO2 power conversion system to generate electricity. An external cooling system is
used to maintain temperatures of the power conversion system, and fission product gases caused
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by fission of 233U must be removed from the primary fuel salt. From this basic description, the
reader sees that there are essentially seven major subsystems:
1. Reactor Core and Vessel
2. Primary Fuel Salt loop
3. Intermediate Coolant Salt loop
4. Chemical Processing Plant
5. Off-gas Handling Plant
6. Power Conversion System (Supercritical CO2 Closed Brayton-cycle)
7. External cooling system
Because the power conversion system and external cooling system are already used in coaland natural gas-fired power plants, the technology is well established and not included in the
initiating event analysis. A more detailed description of the design and role of each new subsystem
is provided in the following sections.
2.1 REACTOR CORE AND VESSEL
The reactor core and vessel of the Flibe Energy LFTR serve several functions crucial to
successful operation and safety of the reactor. The reactor core contains a matrix of solid graphite
material whose large macroscopic cross-section for scattering makes it a perfect for thermalizing
neutrons. The remainder of the reactor vessel will be constructed of Hastelloy-N and serves the
structural purpose of separating the fuel salt and blanket salt, and directing the hot fuel salt exiting
the core to the primary fuel salt loop (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-8). In the two-fluid
MSR design, the fuel salt and blanket salt must be kept separate by designing the reactor vessel
with two plenums that are physically separated to direct fuel salt through the core and maintain
blanket salt surrounding the core.
Active and passive control rod systems are designed to be inserted or withdrawn from the
reactor core to maintain a critical nuclear reaction. Common with traditional PWRs, active control
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rods would be made of neutron-absorbing material and controlled by a human operator. In order to
maintain a critical reaction, the operator could insert the rods to absorb neutrons, slowing or
stopping the nuclear reaction as desired. Another design option for the LFTR active control rod
system is a pneumatically actuated “liquid control rod” that utilizes a column of blanket salt whose
height is adjusted by varying the pressure of helium over the fluid. Theoretically, this liquid control
rod would fail open during a loss of electrical power, with gas pressure being vented allowing the
neutron-absorbent blanket salt to fill a central channel and shut down the reactor (Electric Power
Research Institute 2015, 3-9). Additionally, novel in the LFTR is the concept of passive control rods.
Due to the neutron-absorbing properties of the blanket salt, it has been identified that a loss of
blanket salt would cause an increase in reactor power. To compensate for this increase in reactor
power, passive control rods are designed to “float” on the blanket salt, remaining outside the
reactor core during normal operations. Upon a blanket salt leak, these floating control rods would
lose buoyancy and lower into the reactor core, slowing the nuclear reaction or shutting down the
reactor until the casualty has been corrected. (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-9).
During the thorium fuel cycle following neutron-absorption in the blanket salt, 233Th βminus decays into 233U, which generates heat. A small heat exchanger is being designed to
accommodate cooling of the blanket salt. Natural circulation drives the blanket salt through the
heat exchanger to maintain proper temperatures surrounding the core.
2.2 PRIMARY FUEL SALT LOOP
The Primary Fuel Salt loop serves to direct hot fuel salt from the reactor core to the primary
heat exchangers, where heat is rejected to the intermediate loop coolant salt and then recirculated
to the core. A primary fuel salt pump provides the pressure differential to overcome losses in the
primary heat exchanger and the reactor core.
Additionally, the primary fuel salt loop contains the fuel salt drain tank and cooling system.
At the lowest point in the primary fuel salt loop, a freeze plug is maintained solid by an active
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cooling system. In the event of a casualty in which the fuel salt overheats, coolant flow stops or the
active cooling capacity of the freeze plug is exceeded, the freeze plug fails open and gravity drains
the primary fuel salt into a subcritical fuel salt drain tank (Electric Power Research Institute 2015,
3-9). Because the drain tank does not contain the required geometry of graphite to thermalize
neutrons and cause absorption by 233U, the nuclear fission reaction will immediately cease, causing
the fuel salt to solidify in a stable condition until corrective actions and cleanup can occur.
2.3 INTERMEDIATE COOLANT SALT LOOP
The Intermediate Coolant Salt loop serves to keep the primary fuel salt physically separate
from the power conversion system. This design serves a crucial role in plant integrity as the power
conversion system operates at extremely high pressures (~200 Bar) (Electric Power Research
Institute 2015, 3-10). Due to the high boiling point of the primary fuel salt, the reactor vessel and
primary piping are not designed to accommodate high pressure.
In the absence of an intermediate loop, a rupture in the gas heat exchanger could translate
pressure from the CO2 gas back to the primary loop, causing a rupture and release of radioactivity
from the primary loop. To mitigate this risk, the intermediate loop stands between the highpressure power conversion system and the low-pressure primary loop. Pressure relief valves
designed into the intermediate loop would relieve pressure caused by a failure of the gas heat
exchanger. The subsequent loss of intermediate salt would cause a loss of cooling within the
primary, initiating the melting of the freeze plug and resulting in the complete draining of the
primary loop into the subcritical drain tank (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-10).
Included in the Intermediate Loop are another coolant salt pump and the salt side of the gas
heat exchanger for transferring thermal energy to the supercritical CO2 Closed Brayton-cycle power
conversion system.
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2.4 CHEMICAL PROCESSING PLANT
The function of the chemical processing plant is to remove radioisotopes from the blanket
salt that are generated from neutron-absorption of the fertile 232Th. These isotopes are primarily
protactinium-233 (233Pa) and uranium-233 (233U). Ultimately, the 233U will be returned to the
primary fuel salt loop to serve as fuel. A secondary function of the chemical processing plant is to
remove fission products from the primary loop and prepare them for storage or shipment off-site.
The chemical processing plant is extremely complicated and must handle both gaseous and
liquid metal radioactive byproducts of fission and absorption. One major safety concern is the
production of gaseous fluorine and hydrogen, both of which are highly chemically reactive. Flibe
Energy intends for the Chemical Processing Plant to operate primarily with human supervision but
with limited human actuation (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-11). Due to the high
operating temperatures and high radioactivity of fluids in the system, continued research and
development is needed before the chemical processing plant is ready for use in the LFTR.
These safety concerns and the lack of proven design data will be addressed in greater detail
in the initiating event analysis within this thesis.
2.5 OFF-GAS HANDLING SYSTEM
Following fission of 233U, Xenon and Krypton gases build up in the primary loop and must be
removed to prevent gas pockets from interrupting the hydraulic performance of the fuel salt in the
reactor core. Fortunately, most isotopes of Xenon and Krypton formed from fission are short-lived
and decay into stable elements within approximately 30 days (Electric Power Research Institute
2015, 3-12).
The off-gas handling system serves to redirect these fission product gases to the fuel salt
drain tank, where most of the radioactive decay will occur transforming Xenon and Krypton into
the stable non-gaseous daughters Cesium, Rubidium, Strontium and Barium. Gaseous Krypton and
Xenon are then passed through a charcoal filter cooled by water. This gas stream is cryogenically
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frozen and the Xenon bottled for resale. Krypton gas still contains radioactive Krypton-85 (half-life
of 10 years) and must be stored until complete decay. Helium gas from this process is redirected to
the chemical processing plant for use cleaning the fuel and blanket salts (Electric Power Research
Institute 2015, 3-12).
The mechanical requirements to accomplish off-gas handling are relatively simple, and the
radioisotopes are well understood as they are common between the LFTR and LWRs.
Figure 5 represents a simplified reactor schematic including all of the major subsystems
described in Chapter 2.

Blanket Salt
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Chemical
Processing Plant

(Fissile)

Off-gas
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Graphite
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Plug

(Fissile)
Drain Tank

Figure 5. Liquid Fluoride Thorium Reactor
Modified from “Introduction to Flibe Energy” (Sorenson and Dorius 2011)
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CHAPTER 3
APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
Several resources exist that guide the conduct of Probabilistic Safety Assessments.
Primarily, the IAEA Technical Document 719 titled Defining Initiating Events for Purposes of
Probabilistic Safety Assessments (1993) provides guidance on how to develop a complete list of
initiating events (IEs).
An initiating event is defined as “an occurrence that creates a disturbance in the plant and
has potential to lead to core damage, depending on the success or failure of the various mitigating
systems in the plant” (International Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 7). In traditional nuclear reactors,
core damage refers to the release of nuclear fuel and fission products from the fuel elements into
the primary coolant. Damage to the reactor core could ultimately lead to the release of fuel or
fission products to the surrounding environment and result in public exposure. Since the nuclear
fuel is already homogenously distributed in the primary coolant of the LFTR, the definition of core
damage must be slightly altered for application to molten salt reactors. For the purpose of this
thesis, core damage for the LFTR is defined as the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the
primary plant boundary. This could include the release of fuel salt or fission product gases from the
primary boundary.
This change to the definition of core damage focuses the scope of this thesis to investigate
only those initiating events with the potential to release long-lived radioisotopes from the primary
plant boundary to the surrounding environment. The research questions to be addressed are
1. Which hazard scenarios from Table 4-4 of the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt
Reactor Design” (2015) would result in the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the
primary plant boundary?
2. Which initiating events would cause the realization of the hazard scenarios identified
above?
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Initiating events are generally broken down into three categories: loss-of-coolant accidents
(LOCA), transient IEs and special or “common cause” IEs.
The LOCA refers to any mechanical failure resulting in loss of the primary coolant and is
extremely concerning in PWR and BWR applications because it results in a rapid loss of cooling
capability for the solid nuclear fuel (International Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 19). In the LFTR,
where nuclear fuel and fission products are already suspended within the coolant by design, a LOCA
itself would constitute the release of long-lived radioisotopes from the primary plant boundary.
Therefore, any transient or special IE identified that leads to a LOCA will constitute core damage as
defined above.
Transient initiating events refer to those that result in a disturbance during normal plant
operation but do not result in a loss of coolant. Still, transient IEs require either automatic or
manual plant shutdown to prevent equipment damage or the release of radioactivity (International
Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 20).
Special initiating events are those that, in addition to requiring plant shutdown, also disable
one or more safety systems intended to mitigate the risk of radioactive release (International
Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 20).
Determining a comprehensive list of transient and special initiating events must be done
using several methods. Due to the lack of operating experience with MSRs and due to the
limitations inherent to early design phase reactors, the following methods will be used to
determine transient and special initiating events for the Flibe Energy LFTR:
1. Engineering evaluation and technical study of the plant
2. Review of EPRI Lists of initiating events (EPRI-NP-2230, NUREG/CR-3862, 6928, 5750,
1829)
3. Reference to previous Probabilistic Safety Assessments
4. Logical Classification
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a. Fault Tree Analysis (deductive reasoning)
b. Event Tree Analysis (inductive reasoning)
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
The first step in proceeding with the Initiating Event Analysis is to perform and engineering
evaluation of the Flibe LFTR as described by the EPRI (2015) and attempt to determine which
hazards may result in the release of long-lived radioactivity. A review of EPRI and NUREG Initiating
Event Lists and reference to previous PSAs will also be conducted to determine applicability of
previously identified initiating events to the LFTR design.
4.1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION AND TECHNICAL STUDY OF THE PLANT
First, consider the hazards that were identified in the “Technology Assessment of a Molten
Salt Reactor Design” (2015).

LFTR System or
Component
Reactor Vessel and
Containment Cell

Hazard Scenario

Unintentional control rod withdrawal
Loss of blanket salt
Premature criticality during filling
Inflow of contaminants or unexpected isotopic ratio in the fuel salt
Breakage of one or more graphite tubes
Inadvertent release of fission product gas from reactor cell or
containment
Fuel Salt Processing
Hydrogen reacts with fluorine in the chemical processing system
Excess pressure in the helium bubbler
Primary Heat Exchanger Minor failure in the primary heat exchanger
Major failure in the primary heat exchanger
Sealed housing for the electric drive motors for pumps fail
Blanket Salt Processing
Inadequate removal of Pa or U from the blanket salt
Electrolytic cell is improperly operated
Off-gas Handling System Potassium hydroxide is released
Drain Tank
Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt
Partially thawed piece of salt plug or solid mass obstructs piping to
drain tank
Table 3. Important Hazards to safety and integrity of the LFTR (Electric Power Research Institute
2015, 4-17)
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Through careful consideration of the discussions in Appendix A of the “Technology
Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) the following hazards were selected for further
study:


Unintentional control rod withdrawal



Breakage of one or more graphite tubes



Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt



Partially thawed piece of salt plug or solid mass obstructs piping to the drain tank
The selection process and justification for inclusion of these hazards is discussed further in

Appendix A to this study. Before conducting an initiating event analysis for these four hazards, it is
necessary to consider the mode of failure that is possible as a result of the realization of these
casualties. Below is a discussion of the potential for core damage and release of long-lived
radioactivity that may result from unintentional control rod withdrawal, breakage of graphite
tubes, inadequate cooling of the drain tank or obstruction of the drain piping.
4.1.1 UNINTENTIONAL CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL
Unintentional or unexpected withdrawal of the control rods from any reactor represents
one of the most concerning reactivity addition casualties because of the potential to cause rapid and
uncontrollable increase in reactivity, which in turn causes temperature increase, potential
structural failure of core materials, and expansion of the fuel salt that may approach design limits.
Perhaps one of the most severe reactor accidents caused by unintentional control rod
withdrawal occurred at the U.S. Army Stationary Low-power Reactor Number 1 (SL-1) operated at
the National Reactor Test Station in Idaho in January 1961. At 9:01 pm on the evening of January
3rd, firefighters and medics responded to radiation alarms and fire alarms at the SL-1 site where
three men had been conducting routine maintenance in preparation for reactor operations in the
coming days. An explosion had occurred at SL-1 due to the inadvertent withdrawal of a central
control rod beyond the allowable limit. Two of the three technicians were pronounced dead at the
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scene and one perished during resuscitation efforts. In addition to the loss of life, the SL-1 reactor
site itself was completely destroyed by the explosion. The reactor vessel had jumped almost nine
feet in the air, shearing connecting piping due to the blast (Thatcher n.d., 11), and several of the
reactor control rods had been ejected from the core resulting in overheating and failure of the fuel
cladding. After an exhaustive investigation, it was determined that inadvertent control rod
withdrawal had caused the reactor explosion and the deaths of three military technicians who were
on site. Part of the required maintenance called for the technicians to manually raise the control
rods from within the core with the reactor shutdown (Thatcher n.d., 2). Accidentally raising the
center control rod to a height of over 20 inches, one technician unknowingly added enough positive
reactivity to cause the reactor to experience “prompt criticality,” a condition in which neutrons are
generated so rapidly from fission that the reaction becomes uncontrollable. This condition resulted
in a vaporization of fuel materials and a steam explosion, which ejected the center control rod and
killed the technician instantly. This accident constituted the first nuclear accident-related fatality
and indeed the first “reactor accident” in the United States.
In the aftermath of the SL-1 accident, significant improvements were made to design and
safety requirements in modern nuclear reactors. Among them, more controlled maintenance
evolutions and procedures were developed. More importantly, reactor designs were improved such
that withdrawal of a single control rod could not add enough positive reactivity to cause such a
significant power excursion. It is with the SL-1 accident in mind that the Flibe LFTR liquid control
rod design must be critiqued and considered.
In the Flibe LFTR, there is discussion of use of a liquid control rod containing blanket salt
(neutron-absorbent) that will “fail open” upon loss of power (Electric Power Research Institute
2015, 3-9). However, another potentially damaging scenario has not been considered – rapid
overpressurization of the blanket salt control rod that causes an almost immediate ejection of the
liquid control rod. Research indicates that there is little to no experience using this concept of liquid
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control rods in modern nuclear power plants. The closest comparison is hydraulically-operated
solid control rods, which use water to actuate pistons to raise and lower solid control rods within a
reactor core. The concern with reliable operation of hydraulically-operated control rods is so
important that specific safety mechanisms have been designed to prevent overpressurization of
actuating fluid which could result in ejection of control rods (Carruth 1989). In the Flibe Energy
LFTR System Design Description, limited design detail is offered for the proposed liquid control rod
system. As such, assumptions are made about the basic engineering design required to accomplish
such a system. It is assumed that a blanket-gas will be kept pressurized over the blanket salt control
rod, maintaining a column of blanket salt of specific height in the center of the reactor core to act as
a neutron absorber to control neutron flux. A single valve or series of valves subsequently referred
to as the “blanket-gas control valve” will be used to govern the pressure of the blanket-gas, which in
turn governs the liquid control rod height. Some form of overpressure protection system will be
included to prevent rapid pressurization of the blanket-gas. The next iteration of Flibe Energy LFTR
must include further design detail for the liquid control rod system to allow more thorough
evaluation of the risks. Though a novel concept with potential for success, the risk of control rod
ejection through overpressurization of a liquid control rod system has not been thoroughly
addressed for the Flibe LFTR.
There are several mechanisms of failure that may result from uncontrolled rod withdrawal.
As demonstrated in the SL-1 accident, prompt criticality and fuel vaporization represent the most
extreme mode of failure (Thatcher n.d.). However, the expected thermal expansion of the fuel salt
may also represent a hazard to plant integrity. In pressurized water reactors, thermal expansion
occurs in the light water coolant circulated through the core during normal operations and power
transients. This thermal expansion is accommodated by an expansion volume called the
pressurizer. Any condition in which the pressurizer is not available to accommodate thermal
expansion of the water is referred to as “solid plant operations” and is known to be very dangerous
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because the potential exists to rapidly overpressurize the primary system and cause brittle fracture
of the reactor vessel or primary plant piping (International Atomic Energy Agency 2010, 16). As of
now, the Flibe Energy LFTR has no design feature to accommodate thermal expansion of the fuel
salt during normal or casualty modes of operation. Indeed, during elicitation of expert judgment in
May 2015, the EPRI and Flibe Energy acknowledged that design features such as surge capacitors
must be added to the LFTR to accommodate this thermal expansion of fuel salt (Electric Power
Research Institute 2015, A-5 and A-10).
Consider the following discussion of the potential changes in fuel salt volume based on
thermal expansion. Under normal operating circumstances, fuel salt will enter the reactor at 500°C
with a density of 2005.1 kg/m3 and exit at 653°C with a density of 1952.1 kg/m3 (Electric Power
Research Institute 2015, 3-15). Though Flibe Energy has not confirmed the total fuel salt volume of
the LFTR, an approximation can be made based on similar proposed molten salt reactor designs. In
Japan, the superFUJI MSR is a 2,272MWt/1,000MWe plant with a 62.0 m3 inventory of primary fuel
salt and the FUJI-Pu MSR is a 250MWt/100MWe plant with a 12.0 m3 inventory of primary fuel salt
(Yoshioka, et al. 2016, 24-27). By scaling the FUJI MSR designs, the 600MWt/250MWe Flibe LFTR
may be expected to contain between 16.0-28.8 m3 of primary fuel salt for an average of 22.4 m3 of
primary fuel salt (~50 tons). Given the expected change in density across the reactor core, it is seen
that there is a 2.7% increase in volume of the fuel salt under normal steady state conditions alone.
This equates to a 0.6 m3 change in volume during normal reactor operations. Under transient or
casualty conditions, this thermal expansion could reasonably exceed 1.0 m3, necessitating some
form of expansion volume or surge capacitor to prevent rapid overpressurization of the reactor
vessel and primary loops. The absence of an expansion volume effectively constitutes “solid plant
operations” and places the LFTR at risk for brittle fracture or pressurized thermal shock (Boyd
2008, 463).
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Overall, the hazard of unintentional control rod withdrawal in the LFTR presents significant
safety and integrity concerns. The liquid control rod concept is in the early design phase and suffers
from a lack of detail and the potential for control rod ejection. The mechanism of failure due to
unintentional control rod withdrawal is prompt criticality as a worst case scenario, and at the very
least the potential for thermal expansion of fuel salt resulting in fracture of the reactor vessel or
primary plant boundary due to the absence of any sufficient expansion volume.
4.1.2 BREAKAGE OF ONE OR MORE GRAPHITE TUBES
During design and operation of the MSRE at ORNL, breakage of one or more graphite tubes
was recognized as “the scenario that could represent the largest reactivity addition” to a molten salt
reactor (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, A-12). Several mechanisms exist whereby
breakage of the graphite fuel tubes or moderator elements may result in higher reactivities within
the core. The most credible and severe accident involving the graphite moderator is a net fuel
addition to the core region due to the expulsion of graphite and replacement with fuel salt (Kasten
1967, 18). This would result in net positive reactivity addition and a power excursion due to higher
fuel concentration in the core region. Still, some studies for the MSRE postulated that the net
addition of reactivity due to replacing graphite with fuel salt would be negligible and does not
present a safety hazard (Beall, et al. 1964, 219). Other mechanisms for reactivity increase due to
loss of graphite or permeation by fuel salt include (Beall, et al. 1964, 219-221):


Bowing of the graphite moderator and fuel channels due to irradiation, resulting in higher
localized fuel concentrations within the core region,



Graphite shrinkage that causes decreased moderator volume and larger fuel channels,



Fuel salt permeating the pores in the graphite resulting in increased amount of uranium in
the core and higher levels of afterheat in the graphite following shutdown due to the
sustained reaction occurring in the moderator,
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Sorption of uranium onto the graphite surface due to irradiation and fission at elevated
temperatures causing higher reactivity levels during normal operation, higher graphite
temperatures and higher levels of afterheat.
Though initial safety assessments of the MSRE indicated little impact on safety due to loss of

graphite in the core, this potential casualty must be further studied as a possible cause for core
damage. One hazard scenario not discussed in the MSRE Safety Analysis is the potential for
localized regions of high neutron flux due to failure of the graphite moderator. For example, in the
event of breakage of one or more graphite tubes, fuel salt channels may be obstructed which may
allow for regions of high temperature, high neutron flux and low fuel salt flow due to off-design
clearances within fuel salt channels. These localized regions of higher neutron flux would not likely
cause catastrophic power transients, which also means that automatic protective action such as a
reactor scram would not likely occur. However, localized regions of the core may experience
temperatures in excess of design allowance, which could result in further structural damage or at
worst a failure of core integrity due to overheating. This casualty would be similar to a coolant
channel blockage in LWRs where material obstruction causes insufficient flow and higher
temperatures to occur within a localized region of the reactor core (Salama and El-Morshedy 2011).
Coolant channel blockage in LWRs can lead to a failure of fuel cladding and the introduction of
nuclear fuel and fission products to the primary coolant which constitutes core damage under the
traditional definition.
Another mode of failure may result from transport of the broken graphite moderator to the
primary fuel salt loops or to the drain tank piping. Section 4.1.4 includes further discussion of the
impact of the graphite moderator’s presence in the primary loops or drain tank piping.
Of course, determination of the feasibility of core damage in the LFTR due to breakage of the
graphite moderator is dependent on design-specific neutronic calculations for this casualty which
are not yet available. One recommendation is to conduct “hot channel analysis” and to investigate

33
the impact of fuel salt channel blockage on core integrity in a graphite-moderated MSR such as the
LFTR. For the purpose of this study, the author assumes that breakage of one or more graphite
tubes has the potential to result in core damage due to localized overheating or gross addition of
positive reactivity described by Beall et al (1964).
4.1.3 IMPROPER OR INADEQUATE COOLING OF THE DRAINED FUEL SALT
In the Flibe Energy LFTR, the passively cooled subcritical drain tank stands as one of the
most crucial components to demonstrating the “walk-away safety” advertised by designers. For
most credible casualties resulting in overheating of the reactor fuel salt, the safety mechanism is a
freeze plug which melts and enables draining the contents of the reactor to a subcritical drain tank
where the nuclear reaction is impossible. Here, the drained fuel salt cools and solidifies until
corrective action and cleanup can be performed (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-9).
Additionally, engineers have developed two potential flowpaths into the drain tank under casualty
conditions. The first is a dedicated piping system from the freeze plug to the drain tank, designed to
accommodate transport of the fuel salt during an accident or during normal shutdown operations.
The second is a catch pan beneath the reactor vessel designed to direct molten fuel salt into the
drain tank in the event of gross reactor vessel damage (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 325). In all cases, the drain tank is designed to utilize passive cooling where heat is rejected to the
outside environment and no electrical power or active cooling mechanisms are required for safe
operation.
If the drain tank is expected to be the cornerstone of passive safety under all casualty
conditions, which result in fuel salt exiting the reactor core, serious consideration must be given to
the integrity of the tank and the design-specific features, which guarantee proper performance.
Currently, the LFTR design team proposes a single drain tank “with sufficient volume to receive the
entire inventory of fuel salt from the primary loop” and must “incorporate sufficient passive cooling
capability to accommodate the thermal load of a fuel salt inventory that contains a fresh,
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equilibrium inventory of fission products” (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, 3-22). The
specific mechanism for passive cooling is not proposed, though Appendix B presents the options of
water, liquid metals, fused salts, organics or gases (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, B-2).
Though Flibe Energy dismissed the impact of this hazard as “very low due to passive heat removal
system,” a review of the literature suggests that proper design of the fuel salt drain tank is crucial to
its integrity.
During design and operation of the MSRE at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 1960s,
engineers performed analyses to determine the feasibility of criticality being achieved in the fuel
salt drain tanks. In its original configuration, the MSRE was fueled by 235U and included four salt
drain tanks: two for fuel salt, one for coolant salt and one for flush salt. Designers acknowledged the
remote possibility that concentration of 235U may increase as the fuel salt freezes and could result in
criticality being achieved within the drain tank (Robertson 1965, 220). More specifically, it was
demonstrated empirically that equilibrium cooling of fuel salt mixtures resulted in segregation of
UF4 from the fuel salt carrier and a subsequent concentration by a factor of three in the last phases
to freeze (Beall, et al. 1964, 230). Although the 235U-loaded MSRE required concentrations of fourtimes normal or higher to achieve criticality in the drain tank, this risk was obviated completely by
splitting the contents of the fuel salt into two separate drain tanks in the MSRE. Moreover, bayonet
heat exchanger thimbles carrying liquid water would operate by natural circulation, with liquid
water turning to steam while removing heat from the fuel salt (Beall, et al. 1964, 30). This system
was meant to preclude the possibility of criticality in the fuel salt drain tanks. However, with the
introduction of 233U to the MSRE in 1968, scientists and engineers were forced to revisit this
possibility.
It was determined that the nuclear reactivity of 233U in the fuel salt drain tanks is higher
than that of 235U, which required further analysis on the credibility of criticality and structural
failure within the drain tanks. Engineers determined that the most reactive situation would occur if
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the entire contents of the fuel salt were present in a single drain tank with thimbles full of water,
resulting in higher concentrations of uranium and the presence of a moderator in the form of liquid
water. According to calculations, fuel salt at 1200°F with no water in the thimbles would keep the
drain tank subcritical with a multiplication factor (keff) of 0.85. However, under the most reactive
conditions with fuel salt at room temperature and water in the thimbles, criticality in the fuel salt
drain tank could be achieved with keff = 1.0. Splitting the uranium inventory into two drain tanks
resulted in a subcritical configuration with a maximum keff =0.88 (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 68).
Though the temperature rise may not be significant (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 69), the
concern is valid that criticality may be achieved in the drain tanks under the right conditions.
Elements key to successful operation of the drain tank will be detailed neutronic calculations on the
feasibility of criticality, estimated temperature changes under conditions of criticality, and selection
of appropriate passive cooling systems. Currently, the Flibe Energy LFTR is considering use of a
convective air cooling system similar to the direct reactor auxiliary cooling system (DRACS) loop
which is also used in the fluoride-cooled high temperature reactor (FHR) (Electric Power Research
Institute 2015, 4-15). Use of air convection for passive cooling removes the possibility of water
providing neutron moderation in the drain tank. Additionally, the LFTR design must consider the
impact of the graphite moderator entering the drain tank following breakage of one or more
graphite tubes. This addition of moderator to the drain tank contents may also enable criticality and
a temperature rise in the drain tanks. Because there are credible scenarios under which criticality
and temperature rise may occur in the drain tanks, inadequate cooling of the drain tanks represents
a real hazard, which may lead to the release of radioactivity from the reactor core to the
surrounding environment.
4.1.4 FAILED FREEZE VALVE OR OBSTRUCTION OF THE PIPING TO THE DRAIN TANK
In conjunction with the drain tanks, the freeze valve and associated drain piping represent
some of the most important passive safety features of the LFTR design. During many design-based
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casualties, safety can be shown for the LFTR when the freeze valve melts, allowing the fuel salt
inventory to separate from the graphite moderator and drain to subcritical tanks (Electric Power
Research Institute 2015, 3-8). Unfortunately, the EPRI evaluation of the Flibe Energy LFTR does not
thoroughly address the hazards associated with obstruction of drain piping and focuses only on the
occurrence of this casualty during reactor fill. Potential hazard scenarios that obstruct this crucial
flowpath must be considered in detail for their impact on overall safety and integrity of the LFTR,
especially during reactor operations and casualty scenarios.
Depending on the type of obstruction, this hazard may result in different types of failure.
Consider an obstruction in the form of partially thawed freeze plug. This may result in the fuel salt
remaining in the reactor core, where moderation occurs and the nuclear reaction can be sustained.
Thermal expansion of the fuel salt could result in rapid pressurization of the primary system as
described in Section 4.1.1. In the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor design from Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, an allowance was made for overfilling or thermal expansion, which caused fuel salt to
overflow through a standpipe into the fuel salt drain tanks (Robertson, Smith, et al. 1968, 47).
However, the LFTR still has insufficient design features allowing for thermal expansion of the fuel
salt, relying only on the off-gas handling lines as overflow for expanding fuel salt (Electric Power
Research Institute 2015, A-10 and A-36).
Additionally, criticality may be maintained in the core region due to the inability to drain
the fuel salt to a subcritical configuration. Criticality of course means a rise in fuel salt temperatures
with the inability to drain the core to the drain tanks. In one study, thermal calculations were
conducted to estimate the temperature rise due only to decay heat, not including fission, during a
casualty where fuel salt was not drained. It was determined that fuel salt would reach ~1200°C
within 8 minutes and potentially cause core damage if the fuel salt could not be drained
(Brovchenko, et al. 2013, 338) as seen in Figure 5.
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Figure 6. Temperature of the Fuel Salt during an Unprotected-loss-of-heat-sink
(Brovchenko, et al. 2013, 338)

Finally, research indicates that freeze valve failure could also occur if a partial thaw results
in piping rupture due to thermal expansion of trapped fuel salt (Beall, et al. 1964, 231). Though
rupture of the drain tank piping would ultimately drain the fuel salt into the LFTR catch pan and
direct the salt to drain tanks, this casualty still constitutes core damage due to the release of
radioactive material from the primary plant boundary.
Another mode of failure would be graphite obstruction of the drain line. The Flibe Energy
LFTR design team did briefly address this concern in Table A-33 by asking “What if a piece of
graphite enters the drain tank in the event of an emergency drain?” (Electric Power Research
Institute 2015, A-36). In addition to the effects described above, namely thermal expansion of the
undrained fuel salt and supercriticality in the core region, graphite blockage of the drain piping
presents its own unique challenges. Unlike a partially thawed freeze plug, graphite blockage
represents a moderator material past which the fuel salt would flow. This could result in fissions
taking place in the drain piping, which is not rated to accommodate heat increase in the fuel salt
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due to fissions outside the reactor core. Further, the graphite moderator may also make its way into
the drain tanks introducing a neutron-moderating medium to what is intended to be a subcritical
tank. The Flibe Energy LFTR design description briefly addresses these concerns, citing that
graphite floats in the proposed fuel salt material (Electric Power Research Institute 2015, A-36) and
thermal/hydraulic transport phenomena must be better understood to prevent this type of drain
piping blockage.
Although most experts agree on the inherent safety of the molten salt reactor due to the
ability to rapidly drain the fuel contents to a dedicated subcritical tank, the possibility of
obstructing the drain tank piping must be considered for its potential impact on LFTR integrity and
safety. Obstruction of the drain tank piping may result in thermal expansion or supercritical core
conditions, rupture of the drain piping, and the possibility of transporting the graphite moderator
to the drain tanks where criticality outside the core region must be prevented. For these reasons,
blockage of the drain piping is considered a credible hazard with the potential to result in core
damage.
4.2 REFERENCE TO EPRI AND NRC INITIATING EVENT LISTS AND PREVIOUS PSAs
In this section EPRI and Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiating event lists are
considered for their applicability to the LFTR. Additionally, a review of previous PSAs for
Generation IV Advanced Reactors is conducted to determine the applicability of initiating events to
the LFTR. Unfortunately, due to the lack of operating experience of molten salt reactors, the EPRI
and NRC have only published data for initiating events at PWR and BWR power plants. Still, some of
the initiating events developed in these reports may impact the safety and integrity of the LFTR and
will be considered for their applicability in this analysis.
Using hundreds of reactor-years of operating experience, the EPRI and NRC have developed
several transient and special initiating events lists that include probabilities and frequencies of
occurrence based on data from operating experience. Understanding that PWR and BWR
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technology is vastly different from that proposed in the MSR, many of the initiating events compiled
in these lists do not apply and will not be considered. However, there are some fundamental
similarities between LWRs and MSRs in how the LFTR is expected to operate. Of the world’s 441
operating or operational nuclear power plants, 282 are PWRs, 78 are BWRs and the remaining 81
are heavy-water, gas-cooled, graphite-moderated or fast-breeder reactors (Nuclear Power Reactors
2017). To limit the scope of review of EPRI and NRC initiating event lists, this study considers
initiating event lists from only PWRs as they are more prevalent and have significantly more
operating experience than other types of reactors.
4.2.1 EPRI AND NRC INITIATING EVENT LISTS FOR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS
Table 4 represents a list of generic EPRI Initiating Events adjacent to the results of the
Oconee Nuclear Station Probabilistic Risk Assessment (International Atomic Energy Agency 1993,
28-37).

EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR
Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE
1. Loss of reactor coolant flow (One loop)
1. Rod drop
2. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal
2. Inadvertent rod withdrawal
3. Problems with control drive
3. Rod ejection
mechanism/rod drop
4. Leakage from control rods
4. Inadvertent boration or dilution
5. Leakage in primary system
5. Reactor trip
6. Low pressurizer pressure
6. Cold water addition
7. Pressurizer leakage
7. Reactor coolant pump trip
8. High pressurizer pressure
8. Reactor coolant pump seizure
9. Inadvertent safety injection signal
9. Flow channel blockage
10. Containment pressure problems
10. Loss of main feedwater
11. Chemical and volume control system
11. Excess feedwater
malfunction – boron dilution
12. Pressure, temperature, power
12. Loss of condenser vacuum
imbalance – rod-position error
Table 4. EPRI and Oconee Nuclear Station List of IEs for PWR
(International Atomic Energy Agency 1993, 28-37)
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EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR
13. Startup of inactive coolant pump
14. Total loss of RCS flow
15. Loss or reduction in feedwater
16. Loss of reactor coolant flow (One loop)
17. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal
18. Problems with control drive
mechanism/rod drop
19. Leakage from control rods
20. Leakage in primary system
21. Low pressurizer pressure
22. Pressurizer leakage
23. High pressurizer pressure
24. Inadvertent safety injection signal
25. Containment pressure problems
26. Chemical and volume control system
malfunction – boron dilution
27. Pressure, temperature, power
imbalance – rod-position error
28. Startup of inactive coolant pump
29. Total loss of RCS flow
30. Loss or reduction in feedwater (one
loop)
31. Total loss of feedwater (all loops)
32. Total or partial closure of main steam
isolation valve (one loop)
33. Closure of all main steam isolation
valves (all loops)
34. Increase in feedwater flow (one loop)
35. Increase of feedwater flow (all loops)
36. Feedwater flow instability (operator
error)
37. Feedwater flow instability (mechanical)
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE
13. Inadequate main feedwater
14. Feedwater or condensate line breaks
15. Steam line breaks
16. Rod drop
17. Inadvertent rod withdrawal
18. Rod ejection
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Inadvertent boration or dilution
Reactor trip
Cold water addition
Reactor coolant pump trip
Reactor coolant pump seizure
Flow channel blockage
Loss of main feedwater
Excess feedwater

27. Loss of condenser vacuum
28. Inadequate main feedwater
29. Feedwater or condensate line breaks
30. Steam line breaks
31. Turbine and control valve
malfunctions
32. Turbine-bypass valve inadvertent
opening
33. Turbine malfunction
34. Loss of condenser circulating water
35. Small reactor coolant pipe breaks
36. Large reactor coolant pipe breaks

37. Inadvertent pilot-operated relief valve
or safety-valve opening
Loss of condensate pumps (one loop)
38. Reactor coolant pump seal failure
Loss of condensate pumps (all loops)
39. Control rod drive seal failure
Loss of condenser vacuum
40. Interfacing system loss of coolant
Steam-generator leakage
41. Reactor vessel rupture
Condenser leakage
42. Steam generator tube leakage/rupture
Table 4. Continued
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EPRI List of Initiating Events for PWR
43. Miscellaneous leakage in secondary
system
44. Sudden opening of steam relief valves
45. Loss of circulating water
46. Loss of component cooling
47. Loss of service-water system
48. Turbine trip, throttle valve closure, EHC
problems
49. Generator trip or generator-caused
faults
50. Loss of all off-site power
51. Pressurizer spray failure
52. Loss of power to necessary plant
systems
53. Spurious trips – cause unknown
54. Automatic trip – no transient condition
55. Manual trip – no transient condition
56. Fires within the plant

Oconee PRA List of Special and Transient IE
43. Charging exceeds letdown
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Letdown exceeds charging
Inadvertent high pressure injection
Failure on or off of pressurizer heaters
Failure on or off of pressurizer spray
Loss of off-site power

49. Loss of power to necessary systems
50. Loss of power to control systems
51. Loss of service water
52. Loss of component cooling
53.
54.
55.
56.

Loss of instrument air
Integrated control system power
Fires affecting necessary systems
Internal flooding affecting necessary
systems
57. Generator faults
58. Grid disturbances
59. Administrative shutdowns
60. Main steam isolation valve closures
61. Anticipated transient without scram
Table 4. Continued

At the onset, many of the above initiating events can be discarded as not applicable to
molten salt reactor technology. These include pressurizer, feedwater, main steam isolation valve,
steam generator and condenser casualties. Still, many of these systems have parallels in the LFTR
design and thus the initiating event may be modified such that it is applicable to the MSR design.
For example, while there is no feedwater system in the LFTR, the equivalent system is the gaseous
CO2 to be heated for use in the closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system. In PWR applications,
loss of feedwater represents a loss of heat sink to the reactor coolant system just as a loss of CO2
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flow would represent a loss of heat sink for the LFTR coolant salt. Using this approach, initiating
events in Table 4 were screened and altered to ensure applicability to molten salt reactor
technology. The following initiating events were derived from Table 4 giving special consideration
to specific LFTR subsystems and components:


Loss of reactor coolant flow (loss of fuel salt flow)



Inadvertent rod withdrawal or rod ejection (liquid control rod system failure)



Inadvertent control rod injection (rod drop)



Chemical and volume control system malfunction (Off-gas handling and chemical
processing systems)



Startup of inactive fuel salt pump or coolant salt pump



Increase or decrease in coolant salt flow



Increase or decrease in CO2 flow in power conversion system (compressor failure)



Sudden opening of coolant salt relief valves or CO2 relief valves



Loss of off-site power



Loss of power to necessary plant systems



Loss of component cooling systems



Loss of instrument air



Loss of integrated control system power



Flow channel blockage



Cold fuel salt addition



Automatic or manual reactor trips with no transient condition



Fires or internal flooding affecting plant systems
Further review of several NRC Reports resulted in a compilation of the following applicable

initiating events for consideration in this study. Table 5 consists of initiating events gathered from
resources including the NUREG-1150, NUREG/CR-3862, NUREG/CR-6928 and NUREG/CR-5750.
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Initiating Event
Reference
Loss of on-site and off-site AC power and failure of auxiliary cooling
systems, high pressure injection system or reactor coolant pump
seal failure
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Steam generator tube rupture followed by depressurization of the
Commission NUREG-1150
reactor coolant system
1990, 3-1)
Seismic events
Fire within the plant
Loss of vital AC or DC electric bus
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Loss of component cooling water system
Commission NUREG/CR6928 2007, Appendix D)
Loss of condenser heat sink at PWRs
High flux due to rod withdrawal at startup
(Mackowiak, Gentillon
Trip of one or more feedwater pumps
and Smith 1985, Table 57)
Pressurizer spray fails open/closed
Reactivity control imbalance
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Reactor coolant system high pressure
Commission 1999, Table
2-1)
Reactor coolant system low pressure
Table 5. Select U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Initiating Events

The following initiating events were derived from Table 5 giving special consideration to
specific LFTR subsystems and components:


Loss of on-site and off-site AC power resulting in failure of auxiliary cooling systems



Coolant salt heat exchanger rupture followed by pressurization of the fuel salt loop



Seismic events



Loss of vital AC or DC electric bus



Reactivity control imbalance (chemical processing plant malfunction or fuel addition
malfunction)



Reactor coolant system high pressure

4.2.2 REFERENCE TO PREVIOUS PSAs FOR GENERATION IV NUCLEAR REACTORS
Finally, a review of existing PSAs was conducted to ensure completeness of the proposed
initiating event lists. A review of the literature reveals that there are very few mature probabilistic
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safety assessments for molten salt reactors. Table 6 includes those initiating events gleaned from
existing Generation IV Reactor PSAs that are applicable to the Flibe Energy LFTR. Special care was
given not to duplicate initiating events already developed from Tables 4 and 5 above.

Initiating Event
Reference
Secondary shutdown system mistakenly inserted
Core geometry failure
(Zuo, et al. 2017, 678)
Core coolant flow channel or area is blocked
Secondary coolant flow channel blockage
Air cooling tower ventilation doors get stuck
Loss of off-site power without a scram
(Zhang 2016, 395-396)
Radioactive gas waste disposal system leakage or breakage
Radioactive liquid waste disposal system leakage or breakage
Table 6. Initiating Event List compiled from Previous Generation IV PSAs

The initiating events derived from Tables 4 and 5 and those identified in Table 6 are
evaluated by logical classification in Chapter 5 to determine their impact on the Flibe Energy LFTR.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION – LOGICAL CLASSIFICATION
In Chapter 4, technical evaluation of the LFTR plant revealed four principle hazards whose
realization could lead to core damage and the release of radioactive isotopes from the reactor plant
boundary. Review of existing initiating event lists and reference to previous PSAs provides a
starting point for logical classification of specific initiating events impacting the LFTR.
5.1 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault Tree Analysis is defined in the Fault Tree Handbook used by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission as follows:
“Fault tree analysis is a deductive failure analysis which focuses on one particular undesired
event and which provides a method for determining causes of this event. The undesired event
constitutes the top event in a fault tree diagram constructed for the system, and generally
consists of a complete, or catastrophic failure” (Vesely, et al. 1981, III-3).
Four fault trees were constructed, each hosting one of the four principle hazards as the
undesired event at the top of the fault tree. Events were assigned alpha-numeric codes in each fault
tree which aided in developing Boolean expressions for minimal cut set determination. The key for
fault tree coding is as follows:
TXY: Top event
EXY: Intermediate event
CXY: Conditioning event
BXY: Basic event (initiating event)
where X represents the top event and Y is an index for the quantity of events attributed to each top
event. The X-variable takes on values as follows:
1. Uncontrolled rod withdrawal
2. Breakage of one or more graphite tubes
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3. Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks
4. Obstruction of the drain tank piping.
Boolean expressions were formulated utilizing the rules described in the Fault Tree
Handbook (Vesely, et al. 1981, IX-7) and using the laws of absorption, distribution and idempotence.
From the Boolean expressions, minimal cut sets were determined that represent the “smallest
combination of component failures which, if they occur, will cause the top event to occur” (Vesely,
et al. VII-15). A qualitative analysis was conducted to evaluate vulnerabilities and areas for
improvement in the LFTR design. Appendix C contains the derivation of minimal cut sets for each
hazard.

5.1.1 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR UNCONTROLLED ROD WITHDRAWAL
T11
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Figure 7. Fault Tree Analysis for Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal

B11
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T11 – Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Casualty
E11 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during power or startup operations
E12 – Liquid control rod ejection during any operating condition
E13 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during startup
E14 – Continuous Solid control rod withdrawal during power operations
E15 – Overpressurization of the blanket gas used to maintain liquid control rod level
E16 – Control rod drive mechanism fails on due to instrumentation and control failure
E17 – Blanket-gas control valve mechanically fails FULL OPEN
E18 – Blanket-gas control valve is manually FULL OPEN
C11 – No operator action is taken to counter an unexpected control rod withdrawal casualty
C12 – Overpressure protection fails in the blanket-gas control system
C13 – Blanket-gas control valve will FAIL OPEN on loss of instrument air or AC or DC control
power (based on engineering design)
B11 – Operator error or procedural noncompliance causes a continuous rod withdrawal
casualty
B12 – Rod control interlocks fail to operate to prevent rod withdrawal
B13 – Instrumentation and control circuitry failure causes unexpected rod withdrawal
B14 – Seismic event causes mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve
B15 – Fire within the plant causes mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve
B16 – Loss of instrument air to the blanket-gas control valve causes it to FAIL OPEN
B17 – Loss of AC or DC control power causes the blanket-gas control valve to FAIL OPEN
Minimal Cut Set:
T11= (B11•B12)+(B13•C11)+(B14•C12)+(B15•C12)+(B12•C12)+(B11•C12)+
(B16•C12•C13)+(B17•C12•C13)
Results:
Zero single-component minimal cut sets
Six double-component minimal cut sets
Two triple-component minimal cut sets
Figure 7 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are no single-component minimal cut
sets for an uncontrolled rod withdrawal casualty, indicating that based on the availability of design
data, it is expected that multiple initiating event conditions must be present to enable the
uncontrolled withdrawal of either solid control rods or liquid control rods.
Further evaluation of the double-component minimal cut sets reveals that four of the six
require a conditioning event, either C11 or C12 to cause the top event. These conditioning events are
identified as human error (i.e. the operator does not take required actions during a casualty

49
scenario) or material failure (overpressure protection of liquid control rod blanket-gas fails). The
first condition is not further evaluated in this study as it implies human reliability analysis, which is
beyond the scope of this thesis. The second conditioning event, however, reveals an important
vulnerability in the liquid control rod design: although the design “fails open” and allows the liquid
control rod to shutdown the reactor on loss of electrical power, there is insufficient design detail to
prove that the risk of liquid control rod ejection is properly mitigated. The triple-component
minimal cut sets introduce yet another conditioning event, namely the condition that a loss of
power or loss of instrument air would cause the blanket-gas control valve to fail OPEN. This of
course is a design feature and can be engineered to have a probability of identically zero. If the
control mechanism for the blanket-gas is engineered to fail SHUT, the risk is categorically
prevented. However, until further design fidelity is provided for the liquid control rod mechanism,
this condition is considered to impact the likelihood of uncontrolled rod withdrawal in the Flibe
Energy LFTR.
The list of initiating events found to cause uncontrolled rod withdrawal includes:
1. Operator error
2. Failure of rod control interlocks
3. Instrumentation and control failure
4. Seismic event
5. Fire within the plant
6. Loss of instrument air
7. Loss of AC or DC control power
Note that failure of rod control interlocks and instrumentation and control failure appear as
“undeveloped events” in the diamond shapes because detailed design specifications are not yet
available for the Flibe Energy LFTR. In designing this crucial reactor safety logic and circuitry,
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engineers should ensure that rod control interlocks and I&C circuitry address the risks identified
above, where failure of either may cause uncontrolled rod withdrawal.

5.1.2 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR BREAKAGE OF ONE OR MORE GRAPHITE TUBES
T21 Breakage of one or more

Graphite Tubes

To
B33

E21

Breakage during
Maintenance Operations

E24

Breakage during
inspection

E25

E23

E22

Breakage during
Power Operations

Breakage during
Startup

E26

Breakage during
Replacement

E27

Chemical Corrosion
of Graphite Moderator

E28

Pressure Surge

Overheat Condition

E210 Power Excursion

during Startup
B21

Improper Handling

B21

C21
Insufficient
Expansion Volume

Chemical Processing
Plant Failure

Improper Handling

B22
E212

Rod withdrawal
during startup

E29

B25

E211 Pressurized Fuel Salt

Loss of Fuel
Salt Flow

Rod Withdrawal
Casualty

Fuel Salt
Inventory Expands

B24

Loss of Fuel
Salt Flow

Loss of Coolant
Salt Flow B2
B26

Fuel Salt Channel
Blockage

Loss of Coolant
Salt Flow

B26

B25

From
E13
B23

B23

Rod Withdrawal
Casualty

Fuel Salt Channel
Blockage

INT Pressure
Relief Fails C2
2

4

B27

PRI / INT HX
Failure

CO2 / INT HX
Failure

51

Figure 8. Fault Tree Analysis for Breakage of one or more Graphite Tubes

B28
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T21 – Breakage of one or more Graphite Tubes
E21 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Maintenance Operations
E22 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Reactor Startup
E23 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes during Power Operations
E24 – Breakage during Routine Inspection
E25 – Breakage during Replacement of Graphite Tubes
E26 – Chemical Corrosion of the Graphite Moderator during Power Operations
E27 – Pressure surge causing breakage of graphite during Power Operations
E28 – Overheat condition causing failure of the graphite moderator during Power Operations
E29 – Fuel salt inventory undergoes thermal expansion during Power Operations
E210 – Power excursion causing rapid fuel expansion during Reactor Startup
E211 – Pressurized Fuel Salt in the Primary Loops
E212 – Rod Withdrawal Casualty during Reactor Startup
C21 – Insufficient Expansion Volume to accommodate fuel salt inventory expansion
C22 – Intermediate Loop Pressure Relief Valves fail to function
B21 – Improper handling of Graphite Tubes during Inspection or Replacement
B22 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to corrosion of the Graphite
B23 – Loss of Fuel Salt Flow
B24 – Loss of Coolant Salt Flow
B25 – Continuous or Rapid Rod Withdrawal Casualty (Liquid or Solid Control Rod
Configuration)
B26 – Fuel Salt Channel Blockage
B27 – Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat Exchanger Failure
B28 – Intermediate Loop to CO2 Heat Exchanger Failure
Minimal Cut Set:
T21 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + (B11•C11) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) +
(B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)
Results:
Six single-component minimal cut sets
Five double-component minimal cut sets
Zero triple-component minimal cut sets
One quadruple-component minimal cut set
Figure 8 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are several single-component minimal
cut sets identified above which may cause breakage of one or more graphite tubes. The first singlecomponent failure involves improper handling of graphite during maintenance, inspection or
replacement. This risk is primarily driven by human error; therefore, further human reliability
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analysis is not included. It is evident that proper handling of graphite must be a priority to minimize
the possibility of introducing loose graphite to the primary fuel salt loops.
The chemical processing plant is another vulnerability to the integrity of graphite
components within the reactor core. The chemical processing plant described in the Flibe Energy
LFTR System Design Description provides great detail on fuel processing, but offers little insight on
potential corrosion of Hastelloy-N and graphite structural materials exposed to molten salts. A
review of the literature indicates that the threat of corrosion and structural failure due to exposure
to high-temperature, high-neutron flux conditions present in molten salt reactor cores is very real
(Lane 1958, 623). Because there are many modes of failure of the chemical processing plant that
may make the LFTR susceptible to breakage of graphite tubes, this basic initiating event was found
to be of the first-order pending further design detail and studies demonstrating compatibility of
graphite with the proposed fuel and blanket salts.
The remaining single-component minimal cut sets include loss of fuel salt or coolant salt
flow, flow channel blockage and rod withdrawal casualty. All of these initiating events share the
same mechanism of graphite failure – overheating of core material. These same initiating events
reappear as double-component minimal cut sets because, in addition to the potential for overheat
in the core these will cause a pressure surge due to thermal expansion of the fuel salt unless there is
sufficient expansion volume engineered into the LFTR design. These basic initiating events leading
to breakage of graphite tubes can be mitigated by design of a surge capacitor or expansion volume
in the core.
Of course, the least likely hazard is a multi-dimensional failure in that the extreme
pressures from the closed Brayton-cycle supercritical CO2 power conversion system are translated
back through the intermediate coolant salt to the primary fuel salt by failure of heat exchangers and
inoperable pressure reliefs. Accordingly, this hazard takes the form of a quadruple-component
failure. Although unlikely, the consequences of exposing the fuel salt loop and reactor vessel to the
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high CO2 pressures would be catastrophic, and several redundancies are recommended in the
engineering design to preclude the possibility of the power conversion system pressures from
reaching the reactor vessel. These redundancies could include but are not limited to pressure relief
systems in the intermediate coolant salt and primary fuel salt loops, high-pressure rated
intermediate and primary loops, and hardened heat exchangers.
The list of initiating events found to lead to breakage of one or more graphite tubes
includes:
1. Improper handling of Graphite Tubes during Inspection or Replacement
2. Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to corrosion of the Graphite
3. Loss of Fuel Salt Flow
4. Loss of Coolant Salt Flow
5. Continuous or Rapid Rod Withdrawal Casualty (Liquid or Solid Control Rod
Configuration)
6. Fuel Salt Channel Blockage
7. Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat Exchanger Failure
8. Intermediate Loop to CO2 Heat Exchanger Failure

5.1.3 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR IMPROPER OR INADEQUATE COOLING OF DRAIN TANKS
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Figure 9. Fault Tree Analysis for Improper or Inadequate cooling of the Drain Tanks
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T31 – Improper or Inadequate Cooling of the Drain Tanks
E31 – Criticality causes heat increase in the Drain Tanks following transfer of fuel salt
E32 – No criticality occurs in the Drain Tanks following transfer of fuel salt
E33 – Fuel concentration is too high due to freezing and contraction of fuel salt
E34 – Neutron Moderator is present in the Drain Tanks to facilitate Criticality
E35 – Failure of structural integrity of the Drain Tanks following transfer of the fuel salt
E36 – Graphite is transferred to the Drain Tanks during drainage of the fuel salt
E37 – Water is present in the Drain Tanks following transfer of the fuel salt
B31 – Design Deficiency in Drain Tank geometry enables critical fuel concentrations to exist as
the fuel freezes
B32 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading to excessive fuel concentrations in the drained
fuel salt
B33 – Breakage of Graphite Tubes causes transfer of neutron moderating graphite into the Drain
Tanks
B34 – Design Deficiency in selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism could cause water to be
present following fuel salt transfer
B35 – Seismic event before or during fuel salt transfer to the Drain Tanks
B36 – Fire within the plant before or during fuel salt transfer to the Drain Tanks
B37 – Design Deficiency in the selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism causes the air-cooled
system to fail
Minimal Cut Set:
T31 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B34 + B35 + B36 + B37 + (B11•C11) +
(B31•B32) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)
Results:
Ten single-component minimal cut sets
Six double-component minimal cut sets
Zero triple-component minimal cut sets
One quadruple-component minimal cut set
Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks is a fault tree impacted by several
variables as a result of the lack of design detail provided for the Flibe Energy LFTR. The reference
technologies of the MSRE and MSBR at Oak Ridge National Laboratory recognized the possibility of
criticality in the drain tanks and made some design changes to prevent this hazard. The LFTR,
however, does not address this possibility in sufficient detail. As such, there are many singlecomponent minimal cut sets that may lead to criticality or inadequate cooling until further design
detail is available.
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Figure 9 and Boolean reduction indicate that the first six basic initiating events and four
multi-component minimal cut sets listed in the T31 minimal cut set are shared with T21. Because
breakage of graphite tubes may directly contribute to criticality inside the drain tanks, all minimal
cut sets leading to breakage of graphite tubes are included in the basic initiating events for
inadequate cooling of the drain tanks.
Unique to the T31 minimal cut set are seismic events and fires impacting structural integrity
of the drain tanks or the passive cooling system; chemical processing plant failures resulting in high
fuel concentration; or design deficiencies in the drain tanks or selected passive cooling mechanism
that compromise the cooling capacity. A common theme across many of the multi-dimensional
failures is the potential for criticality and rising temperatures of the fuel salt being stored in the
drain tanks. Haubenreich et al. recognized the credible hazard that criticality may exist outside the
core region depending on fuel enrichment, fuel concentration, and the presence of a neutron
moderator in the drain tank (1968, 68). In the absence of any other design information such as
number or configuration of drain tanks, and without sufficient discussion of the proposed passive
cooling design (whether water-based or air-based) several minimal cut sets exist that begin with
“design deficiency” and lead to inadequate cooling of the tanks.
It follows that several of the initiating events for this primary hazard are undeveloped
events. Specifically, there are three undeveloped events considered only as “design deficiencies.”
These include a design deficiency that would allow high enough fuel concentrations to cause
criticality while the salt freezes (Haubenreich, et al. 1968, 68); a design deficiency in which watercooled drain tanks add moderator to enable nuclear fission; and a design deficiency in an air-cooled
system that simply doesn’t have the required passive cooling capacity to prevent structural damage
and release of fuel salt from the boundary. Until further design detail is offered by Flibe Energy and
proof-of-concept work is complete, these undeveloped events will stand as initiating events for
inadequate drain tank cooling.
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The list of initiating events found to lead to improper or inadequate cooling of the drain
tanks includes:
1. Design Deficiency in Drain Tank geometry
2. Chemical Processing Plant Failure
3. Breakage of Graphite Tubes (moderator in the drain tanks)
4. Design Deficiency in the selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism (water-cooled)
5. Seismic event
6. Fire within the plant
7. Design Deficiency in the selection of Drain Tank cooling mechanism (air-cooled)

5.1.4 FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR OBSTRUCTION OF THE DRAIN PIPING
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Figure 10. Fault Tree Analysis for Obstruction of the Drain Piping

Fire w/in Plant
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T41 – Obstruction of the Drain Piping preventing transfer of the fuel salt from the core
E41 – Failed freeze valve during a casualty scenario requiring drainage of the fuel salt
E42 – Material obstruction of the drain piping during a casualty scenario requiring drainage of
the fuel salt
E43 – Failure to secure passive cooling to the freeze valve
E44 – Freeze valve ruptures due to expansion of the frozen salt plug
E45 – Loose material in the primary loops
E46 – Overheat of fuel salt occurs during operations requiring drainage of the fuel salt
E47 – Graphite moderator is present in the primary loops
E48 – Failed plant components are present in the primary loops
E49 – Failed pump components are present in the primary loops (impeller vanes, fasteners etc.)
E410 – Failed valve components are present in the primary loops (valve discs or stems etc.)
E411 – Failed instrumentation components are present in the primary loops
C41 – No colander is factored into the design to prevent loose plant material from entering the
drain piping
B41 – Operator fails to properly secure active cooling to the freeze valve during casualty
scenario
B42 – Instrumentation and control failure prevents securing active cooling to the freeze valve
B43 – Freeze valve design demonstrates vulnerability to failure during thermal expansion of the
freeze plug
B44 – Loss of fuel salt flow causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B45 – Loss of coolant salt flow causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B46 – Rod withdrawal casualty causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B47 – Fuel salt channel blockage causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B48 – Core geometry failure causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B49 – Loss of off-site power without Scram causing rise in temperatures and fuel salt volume
B410 – Seismic Event causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary
loops
B411 – Fire within the plant causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and
primary loop
Minimal Cut Set
T41 = (B41•B42) + (B44•B43) + (B45•B43) + (B46•B43) + (B47•B43) +
(B48•B43) + (B49•B43) + (B410•C41) + (B411•C41) + (B21•C41) +
(B23•C41) + (B24•C41) + (B25•C41) + (B26•C41) + (B22•C41) +
(B11•C11•C41) + (B23•C21•C41) + (B24•C21•C41) +
(B25•C21•C41) + (B26•C21•C41) + (B27•B28•C21•C22•C41)
Results:
Zero single-component minimal cut sets
Fifteen double-component minimal cut sets
Five triple-component minimal cut sets
Zero quadruple-component minimal cut sets
One quintuple-component minimal cut set
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Figure 10 and Boolean reduction indicate that there are no single-component minimal cut
sets for an obstruction of the drain piping. Within the double-component minimal cut sets there are
two distinct subsets: those attributed to inadequate design and those attributed to material
deficiencies. The risk of inadequate design resulting in failure of the freeze plug is driven primarily
by the mechanical considerations. As discussed by Beall et al. there must be careful consideration
during design and testing of the freeze valve to ensure proper melting of the freeze plug, preventing
thermal expansion and rupture of the freeze plug piping (1964, 231). Additionally, the fault tree
reveals that a partially thawed freeze plug would constitute an obstruction of the drain piping and
can only be mitigated by proper design of the valve itself and the active cooling system keeping the
plug frozen.
The remaining double-component minimal cut sets are predicated on material failure and
the conditioning event that no perforated colander or straining device is present to preclude
clogging of the drain piping. Material failure includes anything from the graphite tubing to failed
valve components, check valve or globe valve discs, failed pump components such as vanes or
fasteners, or primary plant instrumentation components that are resident in the fuel salt loop.
These failures could be attributed to chemical corrosion, seismic events, fires or any other basic
initiating event resulting in high temperatures or pressures in the fuel salt loop.
The final triple- and quintuple-component minimal cut sets are very unlikely because of the
order of magnitude. They assume material failure of plant materials due to uncontrolled rod
withdrawal or breakage of graphite tubes, which will lead to obstruction of the drain piping.
The reader will observe that a common factor for 14 of the 21 minimal cut sets is the
conditioning event C41, the lack of a colander present upstream of the drain piping. Without a
colander or strainer device, there is significantly increased risk that an obstruction may be
transported directly into the drain piping and prevent proper draining of the fuel salt.
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Finally, there are two undeveloped initiating events due to a lack of design detail in the
LFTR System Design Descriptions. The first is an instrumentation and control failure that precludes
securing the active cooling system. Because the operator must physically secure the active cooling
system in all but the most severe overheat casualties to ensure the core drains, any fault that
precludes securing cooling would pose great risk to the inherent safety of the LFTR. Secondly, the
freeze valve mechanical design must be confirmed and tested to demonstrate repeated success in
thawing the freeze plug without compromising the integrity of surrounding piping due to salt
expansion. Because these two hazards cannot be further assessed, they remain undeveloped events
but are considered basic initiating events because of their potential for damage.
The list of initiating events found to lead to obstruction of the drain piping includes:
1. Operator error (failing to secure active cooling)
2. Instrumentation and control failure prevents securing active cooling to the freeze valve
3. Freeze valve design deficiency (thermal expansion damages freeze valve piping)
4. Loss of fuel salt flow
5. Loss of coolant salt flow
6. Rod withdrawal casualty
7. Fuel salt channel blockage
8. Core geometry failure
9. Loss of off-site power
10. Seismic Event causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary loops
11. Fire within the plant causing failure of plant components in the reactor vessel and primary
loop
12. Breakage of one or more graphite tubes
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5.2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS
Event Tree Analysis is similar to Fault Tree Analysis in that it explores the sequence of
events leading from initiating event to system or subsystem failure. However, whereas Fault Tree
Analysis uses “top-down” or deductive reasoning, Event Tree Analysis uses “bottom-up” or
inductive reasoning. Event trees were constructed for each of the significant initiating events
determined in previous sections. In some cases, initiating events that could be categorized into
more broad groups were used to illustrate that many event sequences are common to several basic
initiating events.
Traditional event tree analysis calls for the assignment of probabilities to each branch in the
event tree. However, due to the lack of operating experience and limited design data for lithium
fluoride thorium reactors, probabilities were omitted in favor of a qualitative binary analysis. Each
branch of the tree was assigned a value of “Success” or “Failure” based on the possibility of failure,
not probability. As discussed during the engineering evaluation and technical study of the LFTR,
many hazard scenarios exist in which the top events are possible, and event trees constructed below
reinforce the fault tree analysis results indicating which basic initiating events may possibly lead to
each top event. Based on the findings of the event tree analysis, recommendations are made to
improve the engineering design to properly mitigate against the failure modes identified below.
5.2.1 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR UNCONTROLLED ROD WITHDRAWAL
Initiating events for uncontrolled rod withdrawal casualty were grouped into the following
broad categories for Event Tree Analysis:
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Basic Initiating Event
Category
B11 – Operator Error
Human Reliability Analysis
B12 – Rod Control Interlock failure
Rod Control Circuitry and Protective Logic
B13 – Instrumentation and Control error
B14 – Seismic Event
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure
B15 – Fire within the Plant
B16 – Loss of Instrument Air
Blanket-Gas Control Valve Design
B17 – Loss of AC or DC Control Power
Table 7. Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Initiating Event Categories

As previously mentioned, human reliability analysis is not performed within this study and
event trees were not constructed for operator error as an initiating event. Similarly, rod control
circuitry and protective logic remain undeveloped events due to the premature design phase of the
LFTR and event trees cannot reasonably be constructed due to a lack of design detail. As such,
catastrophic mechanical failure of the liquid control rod blanket-gas valves and poor blanket-gas
control valve engineering design were the only initiating event categories analyzed for the LFTR.
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Failure
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Uncontrolled Rod
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No
Success

No

Failure

Yes

Failure

Figure 11. Event Tree for URW – Mechanical Failure of Blanket-gas Control Valve
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Seen in Figure 11, catastrophic mechanical failure of the blanket-gas control valve can be
shown to lead to uncontrolled rod withdrawal. If the control valve fails, high pressure air will be
applied to the top of the blanket salt liquid control rod, causing rapid reduction of the salt column,
in effect ejecting the control rod. The only engineered system to combat this casualty would be
some form of overpressure protection for the blanket-gas, whose failure also constitutes a step
towards uncontrolled rod withdrawal.
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Figure 12. Event Tree for URW – Engineering Design Deficiency in Blanket-gas Control Valve

Figure 12 demonstrates the same event sequence leading to failure as that shown in Figure
11, namely that the application of high pressure air will eject the liquid control rod in the absence of
any overpressure protection mechanism. The one major difference is in the mode of failure that
leads to applying high pressure air to the blanket-gas. Figure 11 assumes a seismic event or fire that
leads to the catastrophic failure of the control valves. In Figure 12, a certain engineering design is
assumed in which the control valves fail OPEN, such as in the use of a solenoid-operated valve or
air-operated valve that uses electrical current or air to close the valve. In this design selection, loss
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of power or instrument air would lead to the uncontrolled application of high pressure blanket-gas
causing rapid expulsion of the liquid control rod. Of course, mitigation of this risk is simple and
requires only that the blanket-gas control valves be designed to fail SHUT, preventing the rapid
pressurization of the liquid control rod during loss of power or loss of instrument air casualties.
5.2.2 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR BREAKAGE OF ONE OR MORE GRAPHITE TUBES
Initiating events for the breakage of one or more graphite tubes were grouped into the
following broad categories for Event Tree Analysis:

Basic Initiating Event

Category

B21 – Improper Handling of Graphite Tubes
Improper Graphite Handling
during Inspection or Replacement
B22 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure leading
Chemical Processing Plant Failure
to corrosion of Graphite
B23 – Loss of fuel salt flow
Loss of Heat Sink
B24 – Loss of coolant salt flow
B25 – Continuous rod withdrawal casualty
Excess Reactivity
B26 – Fuel salt channel blockage
B27 – Primary to Intermediate Loop Heat
Exchanger Failure
Heat Exchanger Failure
B28 –Intermediate Loop to CO2 Heat Exchanger
Failure
Table 8. Breakage of one or more Graphite Tubes Initiating Event Categories

All basic initiating events identified in Table 8 were evaluated using event trees with the
exception of Improper handling of the graphite tubes during maintenance or inspection. This
initiating event is trivial and would lead directly to the breakage of the graphite moderator.
Additionally, this initiating event is mitigated by procedural and administrative requirements as
well as operator control over the evolution. Because these elements are not clearly defined and do
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involve human reliability analysis, the improper handling of graphite is recognized as a basic
initiating event but is not further analyzed for its corresponding event sequence.
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more Graphite
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No
Success

No
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Figure 13. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Chemical Processing Plant Failure

The potential exists for failure of the graphite tubes due to exposure to chemical corrosion
and high-temperature, high-neutron flux conditions within the core (Lane 1958, 623). Figure 13
depicts the event sequence from an initial failure or malfunction in the chemical processing plant,
leading to chemical corrosion of the graphite. If chemistry control procedures and periodic graphite
inspections fail, the potential exists for breakage of one or more graphite tubes.
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Figure 14. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Loss of Heat Sink or Excess Reactivity

Basic initiating events B23 through B26 were categorized and combined into one event tree
shown in Figure 14. The loss of heat sink or excess reactivity casualties represented by the four
basic initiating events from Table 8 all immediately lead to thermal expansion of the fuel salt. In a
reactor fundamentally designed to operate at low pressures, the thermal expansion of the fuel salt
represents a risk for pressure rise and fracture of primary plant components. Several protective
mechanisms exist to mitigate this risk, including an expansion volume to accommodate expanding
fuel salt and overpressure protection in the form of pressure relief valves. If these mitigations fail
and high pressure or temperature conditions permeate the reactor core, breakage of one or more
graphite tubes is possible.
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Figure 15. Event Tree for Breakage of Graphite Tubes – Heat Exchanger Failure

Finally, the failure of the CO2 / Intermediate Coolant Salt Heat Exchanger may also lead to
breakage of one or more graphite tubes due to the translation of extremely high pressures of the
closed Brayton-cycle power conversion system back to the fuel salt loop. As discussed in the
associated fault tree analysis, successful translation of high pressures back to the fuel salt loop
requires several coincident failures and is therefore very unlikely. However, as seen in Figure 15, if
the CO2 / Intermediate Heat Exchanger fails and overpressure protection of the coolant salt loop is
inoperable, the high pressure could rupture the Primary / Intermediate heat exchanger. In the
absence of an expansion volume or primary pressure reliefs, this high pressure would cause a
pressure surge and possible breakage of one or more graphite tubes in the reactor core.
5.2.3 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR IMPROPER OR INADEQUATE COOLING OF DRAIN TANKS
Initiating events for the improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks were grouped
into the following broad categories for Event Tree Analysis:
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Basic Initiating Event

Category

B31 – Design Deficiency – Drain Tank Geometry
B34 – Design Deficiency – Water-cooled
Mechanism
Drain Tank Design Deficiency
B37 – Design Deficiency – Air-cooled
mechanism
B32 – Chemical Processing Plant Failure results
Chemical Processing Plant Failure
in increased fuel concentrations
B33 – Breakage of one or more graphite tubes
Moderator in Drain Tanks
B35 – Seismic Event
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure
B36 – Fire within the plant
Table 9. Improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks Initiating Event Categories

Event tree analysis for the improper or inadequate cooling of drain tanks was challenging
because of the limited discussion in the Flibe LFTR Technology Assessment on design of the tanks
or the cooling circuit. A review of the literature indicates credible hazards exist that are not yet
accounted for by the LFTR design. Basic initiating events B31, B34 and B37 are all predicated with
“Design deficiency” because, in the absence of more detailed plans, these inadequacies could lead
directly to improper cooling of the drain tanks. These design deficiencies are not evaluated in event
tree format but are recognized as vulnerabilities, and will be included in the final discussion and
recommendations to improve upon the existing LFTR design.
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Figure 16. Event Tree for Improper or Inadequate cooling of the Drain Tanks – Chemical
Processing Plant Failure

The event sequence in Figure 16 depicts how failure of the chemical processing plant could
serve as a basic initiating event for criticality in the drain tanks. Based on the research conducted
by Beall et al. for the MSRE, normal fuel concentrations may increase by a factor of three as the fuel
salt freezes and contracts while in the drain tanks (1964, 230). This was determined to be sufficient
to cause keff = 1.0 and allow criticality in the drain tanks even without a moderator such as graphite
or water present. Any further increase in fuel concentration, such as is possible during a chemical
processing plant malfunction, would only worsen the potential for criticality to occur within the
drain tanks. Other factors, such as drain tank geometry and neutron moderator are appropriately
included in the event tree.
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Figure 17. Event Tree for Improper or Inadequate cooling of the Drain Tanks – Breakage of
Graphite Tubes

Though previously identified and evaluated as a top event, the breakage of graphite tubes
also represents a basic initiating event for improper or inadequate cooling of the drain tanks
because it represents the potential for moderator to be hydraulically transported into the drain
tanks. In the fault tree analysis, minimal cut set determination further reduced breakage of graphite
tubes into its basic initiating events. This process was not repeated to conduct event tree analysis;
instead, breakage of graphite tubes was treated as its own initiating event to focus on engineering
design recommendations that would preclude the introduction of moderator to the drain tanks. As
seen in Figure 17, breakage of graphite could lead to transport to the drain piping. At this stage of
the event tree, an opportunity exists to introduce a new design detail to prevent transport of loose
material into the drain piping and tanks. In pressurized water reactors, perforated colanders are
frequently used to encourage thorough mixing of coolant and prevent transport of debris into
piping subsystems (Rhodes and McGregor 2008; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2004, 363).
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Graphite could be prevented from transporting into the drain tanks by a similar device not yet
described in the Flibe Energy LFTR. Finally, a water-cooled circuit would inherently introduce more
neutron moderator to the tanks and is not advised.
5.2.4 EVENT TREE ANALYSIS FOR OBSTRUCTION OF THE DRAIN PIPING
Initiating events for obstruction of the drain piping were grouped into the following broad
categories for Event Tree Analysis:

Basic Initiating Event
Category
B41 – Operator error (failure to secure freeze
Human reliability analysis
plug active cooling)
B42 – Instrumentation and Control failure to
Reactor Protection Circuitry and Logic
secure freeze plug active cooling
B43 – Freeze valve design vulnerable to
Freeze Valve design deficiency
thermal expansion failure
B44 – Loss of fuel salt flow
B45 – Loss of coolant salt flow
Loss of Heat Sink
B49 – Loss of off-site power without scram
B46 – Continuous rod withdrawal casualty
B47 – Fuel salt channel blockage
Excess Reactivity
B48 – Core geometry failure
B410 – Seismic Event
Catastrophic Mechanical Failure
B410 – Fire within the plant
Table 10. Obstruction of Drain Piping Initiating Event Categories

Initiating events involving human reliability analysis and undeveloped engineering design
(B41 through B43) were omitted from event tree analysis. Consequently, basic initiating events B44
through B411 are evaluated in Figures 18 and 19 below to determine the event sequence from
initiating event to subsystem failure.
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Figure 18. Event Tree for Obstruction of the Drain Piping – Catastrophic Mechanical Failure

The event sequence identified above for seismic events or fires within the plant confirms
the associated fault tree analysis, indicating a clear path from catastrophic mechanical failure of
graphite or other plant materials to obstruction of drain piping. As identified in the engineering
evaluation, obstruction of the piping could have important consequences due to the inability to
separate fuel from moderator under casualty scenarios. Important opportunities for prevention of
this hazard are material selection and engineering design to mitigate the possibility of mechanical
failure in the first place; empirical testing demonstrating the credibility of hydraulic transport; and
the inclusion of a perforated colander to prevent any debris from entering undesired piping
systems.
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Figure 19. Event Tree for Obstruction of the Drain Piping – Loss of Heat Sink or Excess Reactivity

The loss of heat sink and excess reactivity initiating event categories have similar event
sequences in the LFTR because both cause an increase in core temperatures and, therefore, thermal
expansion of fuel salt. Under overheat conditions, the freeze plug is designed to melt and open the
flowpath to the drain tanks. Failure of the freeze plug to melt quickly and fully allows for continued
increase in core temperatures and the possibility of core damage. For this reason, a partially
thawed freeze valve causes obstruction of the drain piping. Additionally, freeze valve failure due to
thermal expansion and rupture of the valve body also constitutes core damage. Though the molten
salt would ultimately flow from the ruptured pipe to the catch pan into drain tanks, the rupture
itself represents the release of radioactivity from within the primary plant boundary. Both partial
thawing of the freeze plug and freeze valve rupture are preventable hazards through proper
engineering design and empirical data collection demonstrating the probability of occurrence of
each intermediate event.
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CHAPTER 6
LIMITATIONS
It is important to identify the limitations of application of this research before proceeding to
the conclusion and recommendations. Because the Flibe Energy LFTR is in its early design stages,
system design descriptions lack the level of detail required for component-level failure analysis.
Piping schematics, detailed redundant engineered safety mechanisms and instrumentation
functionality, among other things, are notably absent from the Flibe Energy LFTR system design
descriptions. Observing these limitations on expected plant operation at the component level, this
thesis evaluates the principle of LFTR operation. Even in the absence of component-specific data,
the fundamental normal plant operations were subject to initiating event analysis to provide coarse
recommendations for design improvement. Certainly, on further development of reactor
schematics, the Level 1 PSA must again be analyzed to provide the fine-tuning of componentspecific failure analysis and the application of probabilities of failure to arrive at true core damage
frequencies.
Furthermore, the reader will note that many single-component minimal cut sets resulted
from fault tree analysis for two of the four selected top events. Breakage of one or more graphite
tubes and inadequate cooling of the drain tanks both contain a combined ten unique singlecomponent minimal cut sets. These cut sets may alarm engineers seeking to understand the safety
of the LFTR. Again, it is important to emphasize that these results are based on the system design
descriptions available while conducting this research. In the absence of detailed reactor and
subsystem schematics, assumptions were made about the basic principles of operation of the LFTR.
Some of these single-component minimal cut sets represent true vulnerabilities in the LFTR design,
while others simply reflect a lack of adequate design detail to be evaluated further. The distinction
between which minimal cut sets are of concern and those easily mitigated by plant design will only
become apparent in future phases of development. Nonetheless, given the existing design
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descriptions, these single-component minimal cut sets offer engineers risk-mitigation opportunities
as described in the results and conclusions section of this study.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In the “Technology Assessment of a Molten Salt Reactor Design” (2015) there were 36
hazards identified that posed great risk to safety and integrity of the LFTR. Engineering evaluation
and technical study revealed four of these hazards as potential causes of reactor core damage.
These primary hazards were selected for further initiating event analysis:


Unintentional control rod withdrawal



Breakage of one or more graphite tubes



Improper or inadequate cooling of the drained fuel salt



Partially thawed piece of salt plug or solid mass obstructs piping to the drain tank.
A thorough review of existing initiating event lists maintained by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission and the EPRI as well as consideration of existing PSAs for Generation IV Reactor
Designs resulted in a list of potential initiating events whose feasibility was further evaluated using
logical determination. Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis results were consolidated to
reveal one key list of basic initiating events capable of leading to one or more of the four primary
hazards identified. The majority of these initiating events are shared in common with pressurized
water reactors:
1. Operator Error
2. Rod control interlock failure
3. Instrumentation and control circuitry or protective logic failure
4. Seismic events
5. Fire within the plant
6. Loss of instrument air
7. Loss of AC or DC control power
8. Continuous rod withdrawal casualty
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9. Core geometry failure
10. Loss of off-site power without Scram
Initiating events determined to be unique to the LFTR design are
11. Improper handling of graphite tubes during maintenance or inspection
12. Chemical processing plant failure
13. Loss of fuel salt flow
14. Loss of coolant salt flow
15. Fuel salt channel blockage
16. Drain tank cooling mechanism design deficiency
17. Freeze valve design deficiency
18. CO2 / Intermediate Coolant Salt Heat Exchanger failure
Fault tree analysis and event tree analysis also revealed important opportunities for risk
mitigation to preclude the occurrence of a top level hazard by interrupting the event sequence with
engineered safety features. The safety features identified are


Redundant blanket-gas control valves for a liquid control rod system as well as
overpressure protection to mitigate the risk of liquid control rod ejection



Fuel salt expansion volume to accommodate the thermal expansion and contraction of fuel
salt during all modes of reactor operation



Fuel salt pressure relief system to mitigate pressure surges caused by thermal expansion or
heat exchanger failure



Air-driven cooling circuit with demonstrated success for use in the drain tanks. Avoid the
use of water-cooled systems to prevent inadvertent introduction of a neutron moderator



Perforated colander upstream of drain piping to prevent graphite or other debris from
hydraulic transport into the drain piping or drain tanks
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Squirrel-cage induction motors for use as fuel salt and coolant salt pumps instead of
synchronous motors, obviating the need to design a sealed electric drive motor housing
outside of the primary containment (Appendix A contains further discussion).
Though probabilities of occurrence were unavailable for this study, future research may

find the groundwork provided by fault tree analysis and event tree analysis crucial in quantifying
risks for the LFTR. The basic initiating events identified and the vulnerabilities detected during
analysis offer planners the opportunity to review system design descriptions and properly mitigate
some of the most important hazards for the Flibe Energy LFTR.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL REVIEW OF “WHAT-IF ANALYSIS TABLES” (EPRI 2015, A-1 to A-39)
Hazard Scenario
Unintentional
control rod
withdrawal

Justification for Inclusion/Exclusion from Study
Included:
 Mode: Failure of liquid control rod with
overpressurization of control gas
 Effect: Prompt criticality (see SL-1 casualty)
causing vaporization of core materials
 Effect: Rapid thermal expansion of fuel salt
with no expansion volume causing rupture
of reactor vessel

Loss of blanket salt

Excluded:
 MSRE assessed no hazard due to higher
pressure of blanket salt compared to fuel
salt
 Neutronic computations needed to support
the theory of increase in reactivity due to a
loss of blanket salt
Excluded:
 Precluded by procedural compliance and
operator supervision
Excluded:
 Operational/administrative procedures can
be used to implement changes to the rate of
fuel addition
 Safety systems involving fast control of
reactivity (boron tipped control rods)
provide gross reactivity control
Included:
 Mode: Neutron irradiation and
embrittlement of graphite structural
components
 Mode: Pressure or temperature surge
resulting in mechanical failure
 Mode: Chemical corrosion of graphite due
to fluoride fuel salt interaction
 Effect: Increased reactivity due to increase
in fuel salt inventory in the reactor core
region
 Effect: Blockage of fuel salt channels and
higher neutron flux due to off-design
clearances in fuel salt channels
 Effect: Possible transport of graphite
contaminant to the drain line or fuel salt
drain tank, jeopardizing operability of the

Premature
criticality during
filling
Inflow of
contaminants or
unexpected isotopic
ratio in the fuel salt

Breakage of one or
more graphite tubes

References
- (Thatcher n.d.,
11)
- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, 3-9)
- (Carruth 1989)
- (Boyd 2008, 463)
- (International
Atomic Energy
Agency 2010, 16)
- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-3)
- (Kasten 1967, 18)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-4)
(Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-7)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-12)
- (Kasten 1967, 18)
- (Beall, et al. 1964,
219-221)
-(Salama and ElMorshedy 2011)
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Inadvertent release
of fission product
gas from reactor cell
or containment

Hydrogen reacts
with fluorine in the
chemical processing
system

Excess pressure in
the helium bubbler

Minor failure in the
primary heat
exchanger

Major failure in the
primary heat
exchanger

Sealed housing for
the electric drive
motors for pumps
fail

freeze plug and drain tank safety systems
Excluded:
 Several layers of designed defense by Flibe
LFTR:
- Radiation sensors in containment cell
cover gas
- Operate off gas handling system at lower
pressure than containment cell
- Double walled pipe system with
radiation sensors
Excluded:
 Procedural and administrative controls
would preclude mixing hydrogen and
fluorine.
 Industry practices are being reviewed for
hydrogen management and storage.
 Careful separation of processes is being
designed for the Flibe Energy LFTR.
Excluded:
 Overpressurization could occur to a closed
discharge valve. Recommend mitigation by
inclusion of multiple redundant reliefs and
periodic testing requirements.
 More likely result would be inability to
remove fission products from the reactor,
requiring plant shutdown. No risk of
catastrophic failure.
Excluded:
 Because the coolant salt is kept at higher
pressures (~10-15 bar) than the fuel salt
loop (~1-2 bar), a failure of the primary
heat exchanger would introduce coolant salt
to the fuel loop, reducing reactivity by
displacing fuel. This casualty does not
represent a hazard for a power excursion or
core damage.
Excluded:
 The result of a major primary heat
exchanger failure is a sudden increase of
non-fissile material into the fuel salt loop,
causing a down-power excursion and rapid
lowering of median temperature. This
would require plant shutdown and draining
of the contaminated fuel salt, but does not
present a hazard to core integrity.
Excluded:
 Flibe Energy LFTR proposes pump design
from the ORNL MSBR (Robertson, Smith, et
al. 1968, 44). These pumps are vertical-shaft

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-13)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-23)
- (Kasten 1967, 12)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-25)
- (Beall, et al. 1964,
62)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-26)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-26)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-29)
- (Robertson,
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Inadequate removal
of Pa or U from the
blanket salt

Electrolytic cell is
improperly
operated

Potassium
hydroxide is
released
Improper or
inadequate cooling
of the drained fuel
salt

sump-type single-stage centrifugal pumps
driven by electric motors that require access
for maintenance. This technology preceded
the development of squirrel cage induction
motors, which have since become industry
standard.
 Squirrel cage induction motors currently
comprise 97% of motors used in PWRs and
94% of motors used in BWRs. They are
resistant to degradation in the harsh
environment within the containment
structures of nuclear power plants and are
proven to have a service life of ~40 years.
Recommend using these induction motors
to obviate the need to create sealed electric
drive motor housings outside the primary
containment.
Excluded:
 Insufficient batch filling and shutdown of
processing and reactor system will occur.
 No hazard for core damage is discussed in
the LFTR design or found in a review of the
literature.
Excluded:
 Improper loading of metallic lithium and
thorium into the metallic bismuth stream
could result in inadequate contact with the
blanket salt, but will not change reactivity
significantly. Low loading will cause the
electrolytic reaction to cease.
 Only potential hazard would be bismuth
entering the reactor core where degradation
of Hastelloy-N material may result. This is
precluded by mechanical design separating
the fluids and procedural/administrative
processes to prevent introduction of
bismuth.
Excluded:
 Potassium hydroxide is an industrial safety
concern and may result in chemical
exposure to workers if released
 No radiological hazard exists
Included:
 Mode: Improper selection of passive cooling
mechanism (i.e. water-cooled), which may
encourage criticality in the drain tank
 Mode: Inadequate design resulting in
criticality or excessive temperatures,
causing failure of the drain tank to the

Smith, et al. 1968,
44)
-(Villaran and
Subudhi 1996, 2-1
and 2-13)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, 4-13)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, 4-14 and A31)

- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-34)
- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, 3-22)
-(Robertson 1965,
220)
- (Beall, et al. 1964,
230)
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Partially thawed
piece of salt plug or
solid mass obstructs
piping to drain tank

environment
 Effect: The presence of a moderator in the
drain tank (water or graphite) could enable
criticality leading to temperature rise and
structural failure.
Included:
 Mode: Partial thaw of the freeze valve,
rupture of freeze valve piping due to
thermal expansion, or graphite obstruction
of drain tank piping
 Effect: Inability to separate the fuel contents
from the graphite moderator in the core
region, resulting in sustained fission during
casualty operations
 Effect: Thermal expansion of fuel salt
causing rapid pressure increase in the
reactor vessel
 Effect: Potential rupture of drain piping due
to thermal expansion of freeze plug material
 Effect: Potential fissions outside the core if
graphite obstructs the drain piping or enters
the drain tanks

-(Haubenreich, et
al. 1968, 68-69)

-(Robertson, Smith,
et al. 1968, 47)
- (Electric Power
Research Institute
2015, A-10 and A36)
-(Brovchenko, et al.
2013, 338)
- (Beall, et al. 1964,
231)
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APPENDIX B
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS KEY
PRIMARY EVENT SYMBOLS


Basic Event: A basic initiating fault requiring no further development.



Conditioning Event: Specific conditions or restrictions that apply to any logic gate
(used primarily with PRIORITY AND and INHIBIT gates).



Undeveloped Event: An event that is not further developed either because it is of
insufficient consequence or because information is unavailable.



External Event: An event that is normally expected to occur
INTERMEDIATE EVENT SYMBOLS



Intermediate Event: A fault event that occurs because of one or more antecedent
causes acting through logic gates.
GATE SYMBOLS



AND-Gate: Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur.



OR-Gate: Output fault occurs if at least one of the input faults occur.



EXCLUSIVE OR-Gate: Output fault occurs if exactly one of the input faults occurs.



PRIORITY AND-Gate: Output fault occurs if all of the input faults occur in a specific
sequence (the sequence is represented by a conditioning event drawn to the right
of the gate).



INHIBIT-Gate: Output fault occurs if the (single) input fault occurs in the presence
of an enabling condition (the enabling condition is represented by a conditioning
event drawn to the right of the gate).
TRANSFER SYMBOLS



Transfer in: Indicates that the tree is developed further at the occurrence of the
corresponding Transfer Out (e.g. on another page)



Transfer out: Indicates that this portion of the tree must be attached at the
corresponding Transfer In.
(Vesely, et al. 1981, IV-3)
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APPENDIX C
DERIVATION OF FAULT TREE ANALYSIS MINIMAL CUT SETS
Minimum cut sets for each fault tree analysis diagram were developed using the “Bottom-up
procedure” described in the Fault Tree Handbook (Vesely, et al. 1981, XI-4) for Boolean Equations.
This procedure takes into account each intermediate event from the lowest leading up to the top
event and translates the Boolean logic gates from the Fault Tree Analysis into their mathematical
equivalent. By substituting basic events and conditioning events for each intermediate event, the
minimum cut sets can be determined and qualitatively evaluated to learn more about the failures
leading to each top event.
Uncontrolled Rod Withdrawal Minimum Cut Set Development
E18
E17
E16
E15
E14
E13
E12
E11
T11

= B11 + B12
= B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13
= B13
= E17 + E18
= B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13 + B11 + B12
= B13 + C11
= B11•C11
= E15•C12
= (B11 + B12 + B14 + B15 + B16•C13 + B17•C13) • C12
= B11•C12 + B12•C12 + B14•C12 + B15•C12 + B15•C12•C13 + B17•C12•C13
= B11•B12 + B13•C11
= E11 + E12
= B11•B12 + B13•C11 + B11•C12 + B12•C12 + B14•C12 + B15•C12 + B15•C12•C13 + B17•C12•C13
Therefore:
T11= (B11•B12)+(B13•C11)+(B14•C12)+(B15•C12)+(B12•C12)+(B11•C12)+
(B16•C12•C13)+(B17•C12•C13)

Breakage of One or More Graphite Tubes Minimum Cut Set Development
E212
E211
E210
E29
E28
E27

= E13 = B11•C11
= B27•B28•C22
= E212
= B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + E211
= B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B27•B28•C22
= B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= C21•E29
= C21•(B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B27•B28•C22)
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E26
E25
E24
E23
E22
E21
T21

= B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22
= B22
= B21
= B21
= E26 + E27 + E28
= B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= E210 = E212 = E13 = B11•C11
= E24 + E25 = B21 + B21 = B21
= E21 + E22 + E23
= B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 +
B24 + B25 + B26
Therefore:
T21 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + (B11•C11) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) +
(B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)

Inadequate or Improper Cooling of the Drain Tanks Minimum Cut Set Development
E37
E36
E35
E34
E33
E32
E31
T31

= B34
= B33 = T21
= B35 + B36
= E36 + E37 = B34 + T21
= B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 + B27•B28•C21•C22 +
B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= B31•B32
= E35 + B37
= B35 + B36 + B37
= E33 + E34
= B31•B32 + B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 +
B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= E31 + E32
= B31•B32 + B34 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 +
B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B35 + B36 + B37
Therefore:
T31 = B21 + B22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26 + B34 + B35 + B36 + B37 + (B11•C11) +
(B31•B32) + (B23•C21) + (B24•C21) + (B25•C21) + (B26•C21) + (B27•B28•C21•C22)

Obstruction of the Drain Piping Minimum Cut Set Development
E411
E410
E49
E48
E47
E46

= B410 + B411
= B410 + B411
= B410 + B411
= E49 + E410 + E411
= B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 = B410 + B411
= B410 + B411 + T21
= B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 +
B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= B44 + B45 + B46 + B47 + B48 + B49
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E45
E44

E43
E42

E41
T41

= E47 + E48 = B410 + B411 + B410 + B411 + T21
= B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 +
B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26
= E46•B43
= (B44 + B45 + B46 + B47 + B48 + B49) •B43
= B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43
= B41•B42
= C41•E45
= C41•(B410 + B411 + B21 + B11•C11 + B22 + B23•C21 + B24•C21 + B25•C21 + B26•C21 +
B27•B28•C21•C22 + B23 + B24 + B25 + B26)
= B410•C41 + B411•C41 + B21•C41 + B11•C11•C41 + B22•C41 + B23•C21•C41 +
B24•C21•C41 + B25•C21•C41 + B26•C21•C41 + B27•B28•C21•C22•C41 + B23•C41 + B24•C41 +
B25•C41 + B26•C41
= E43 + E44
= B41•B42 + B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43
= E41 + E42
= B41•B42 + B44•B43 + B45•B43 + B46•B43 + B47•B43 + B48•B43 + B49•B43 + B410•C41 +
B411•C41 + B21•C41 + B11•C11•C41 + B22•C41 + B23•C21•C41 + B24•C21•C41 + B25•C21•C41+
B26•C21•C41 + B27•B28•C21•C22•C41 + B23•C41 + B24•C41 +
B25•C41 + B26•C41
Therefore:
T41 = (B41•B42) + (B44•B43) + (B45•B43) + (B46•B43) + (B47•B43) +
(B48•B43) + (B49•B43) + (B410•C41) + (B411•C41) + (B21•C41) +
(B23•C41) + (B24•C41) + (B25•C41) + (B26•C41) + (B22•C41) +
(B11•C11•C41) + (B23•C21•C41) + (B24•C21•C41) +
(B25•C21•C41) + (B26•C21•C41) + (B27•B28•C21•C22•C41)
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